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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Earlier in this study, I explored the disaster literature and pinpointed the 
contributions made by previous disaster studies and emphasized the gap in the disaster 
literature regarding the determinants of organizational preparedness and mitigation. My 
exploration revealed that there is no theory to guide research on the determinants of 
preparedness and mitigation at the organizational level of analysis. Knowledge of these 
determinants can help to understand the factors that are instrumental in motivating 
organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. This study attempts to 
narrow this gap by studying the determinants of organizational preparedness and 
mitigation for disasters among Memphis/Shelby County organizations.  
The main goal of this study is to answer the question “what are the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” The following four sub-
questions provide good basis for exploring this question. (i) Does concern over disaster 
impact lead to more mitigation and preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship between 
mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles? (iii) Do single location 
organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness than other types of 
organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a positive effect on mitigation and 
preparedness? In order to answer the question regarding the determinants of mitigation 
and preparedness in organizations, this study utilizes four independent variables - concern 
over disaster impacts, organizational obstacles, ownership patterns of organizations, and 
organizational size.  In addition, this study includes three variables as controls for 
organizational sector: education, health, and wholesale/retail trade.  
 xi 
This study uses Tobit regression technique to identify the determinants of 
mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level of analysis. Tobit is appropriate 
because of the censored nature of the dependent variable: Left-censored at zero and right-
censored at 10.  
The main findings of this study are: (1) Organizational size is a strong positive 
determinant of mitigation and preparedness in organizations. Larger organizations in 
Memphis/Shelby County are more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness 
activities compared to smaller organizations. (2) Concern over disaster impact is also a 
strong positive determinant of mitigation and preparedness in organizations. 
Organizations that are worried about the impact of disasters on their organizations are 
more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness activities than organizations that are 
not. (3) There is a non-linear relationship between organizational obstacle and mitigation 
and preparedness activities. The coefficients on organizational obstacle and 
organizational obstacle
2
 show that there is a positive association between mitigation and 
preparedness and organizational obstacles until organizational obstacle peaks and then 
the association becomes negative.  
The policy implications of this study are as follows: (1) The strong positive 
relationship between concern over disaster impact and engagement in mitigation and 
preparedness activities suggests that computer programs capable of estimating different 
type of disaster losses, such as loss of life and property may be able to motivate 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness activities. 
This result suggests that properly designed and implemented programs, which are capable 
of showing organizations the type and extent of losses they stand to incur if a disaster 
 xii 
occurs might be effective in stimulating organizations to adopt mitigation and 
preparedness measures.  (2) The significant positive relationship between organizational 
size and mitigation and preparedness, suggests that governments at all levels should 
regard small businesses as a special group that may need specific incentives to make 
them adopt more mitigation and preparedness activities.  
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This study defines disasters as events, such as floods or earthquakes, which lead 
to major organizational disruption, loss of life, or property destruction. The consequences 
of disasters include but not limited to deaths, loss of properties, and disruption in business 
activities. The colossal nature of disaster-induced losses is, indeed, worrisome and 
evidence from government agencies, insurance community, and the disaster literature 
suggest continued increases in disaster losses (e.g., Munich Reinsurance Group, 2008). In 
light of potential future increases in the number of disasters and consequently, disaster 
losses, there is need to study ways of stemming disaster losses. Although, it is impossible 
to change the magnitude and frequency of disasters, engaging in mitigation and 
preparedness activities can help to ameliorate disaster impacts or consequences. In this 
study, mitigation activities include securing computers and strengthening parts of a 
building, while preparedness activities include attending disaster meeting/training courses 
and arranging site visit by consultants to better prepare for disasters.  
A number of disaster researchers have established the determinants of 
preparedness and mitigation at the household level of analysis. According to this 
literature, adoption of mitigation and preparedness measures depend among other factors 
on family size, education, previous experience with disaster, gender, and income. 
However, at the organizational level, there is limited research on the determinants of 
preparedness and mitigation.   
Many large-n quantitative studies in the disaster management literature have 
focused on levels other than the organization, such as household and community. In 
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between households and communities are organizations, which disaster researchers have 
largely neglected (Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). In this study, the unit of analysis is 
the organization because they are an important decision-making unit in the community 
and undoubtedly a significant contributor to the United States economy, and in particular, 
to the Memphis/Shelby County economy. For instance, small businesses alone provide 
more than fifty percent of the total employment in the United States (Alesch et al., 2001).  
One of the fundamental goals of organizations is survival (Shafritz et al., 2005). 
Disasters constantly threaten this goal by causing organizational disruption and 
undermining the economy of communities (Lindell & Perry, 2007). The challenge for 
organizations is to find ways of ensuring continuity during and after disasters. 
Organizations stand a better chance of surviving disasters if they have preparedness and 
mitigation strategies in place before disasters strike (McManus & Carr, 2001). These 
measures can make it easier for organizations to protect the lives of their personnel and 
properties as well as help their communities to prepare for and mitigate disasters. The 
organizations examined in the study are public agencies, nonprofit groups, and private 
enterprises at risk of major disasters or those involved in seismic risk issues. They 
include but not limited to utility companies, schools, health facilities, chemical 
companies, financial institutions, religious institutions, transportation, and restaurants. 
Disaster researchers have studied how organizations are preparing for and 
mitigating disasters in high seismic regions of the United States, especially California. 
Unfortunately, only a few disaster studies have examined how organizations are 
preparing for and mitigating disaster risks in a moderate seismic region like the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Evidence in the disaster literature suggests that 
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organizations in the NMSZ are not prepared for disasters. This study focuses on 
Memphis/Shelby County because of its high population (Shelby County is ranked 44 out 
of 3141 counties in the United States in 2000 (United States Census Bureau, 2001), 
proximity to the New Madrid Fault Zone, and low level of organization preparedness for 
disasters (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). These three conditions could 
make it possible for a moderate earthquake to cause substantial damage to organizations 
in Memphis/Shelby County. In addition, these conditions make Memphis/Shelby County 
an interesting case to study.  
This study is important to disaster researchers and the emergency management 
community in the following ways: First, it is essential to know the factors that make an 
organization want to prepare for and mitigate disasters. Knowledge of such factors can 
contribute to the development of appropriate theories and provide a solid basis on which 
to institute disaster policies. Second, this study looks at how organizations are preparing 
for and mitigating different types of disasters in the NMSZ. Third, this study may be of 
practical use to the emergency management community, especially those in Memphis 
because it provides hard-to-find information on Memphis/Shelby County organizations’ 
perceived actions regarding risks. Observations from preliminary interviews of 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations suggests that such rare information would be vital 
to the Memphis/Shelby County Emergency Management Agency’s (EMA) plan to 
improve how organizations prepare for and mitigate disasters. Fourth, this study helps the 
Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center, Center for Earthquake Research and 
Information (CERI), Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), and other 
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earthquake organizations by putting earthquakes into the broader context of other hazards 
in organizational decision-making. 
This research question of interest in this study is “what are the determinants of 
mitigation and preparedness in organizations?" Only by identifying these factors will 
policymakers be able to make appropriate policies to stem disaster losses in 
organizations. The following four sub-questions provide good basis for exploring the 
research question. (i) Does concern over disaster impact lead to more mitigation and 
preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship between mitigation and preparedness and 
organizational obstacles? (iii) Do single location organizations engage in less mitigation 
and preparedness than other types of organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a 
positive effect on mitigation and preparedness?  In addition to this main research 
question, I explored these three questions. (i) Which disasters are organizations worried 
about? (ii) Which mitigation and preparedness activities do organizations typically 
engage in? (iii) Do organizations use disaster information in decision-making? The 
current study is pre-event, that is it examines what organizations are doing to mitigate 
and prepare for disasters before disasters strike. Knowing what organizations are doing 
can help policymakers know where organizations are vis-à-vis mitigation and 
preparedness and be able to devise necessary mitigation and preparedness policies to take 
organizations to where they want them to be.  
Chapter II begins by discussing the controversies surrounding the definition of 
disaster and enumerates some examples of past disasters and their estimated losses. Then 
it presents a review of disaster research at the organizational level and an overview of 
emergency management in the United States. Next, it discusses the importance of 
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organizational survival, the determinants of mitigation and preparedness, and 
organizational obstacles. The chapter concludes with background information on 
Memphis. 
Chapter III presents the methodology use in this study. It begins with the 
procedure for data collection and the strengths and limitations of the data. Then it 
presents a model of organizational mitigation and preparedness, the dependent and 
independent variables, the hypotheses to be tested, and the estimation techniques. Chapter 
III concludes with an outline of the Heckman approach to sample selection and a brief 
discussion of sample representativeness.  
Chapter IV presents the results of the descriptive and quantitative analyses. This 
chapter begins with a description of individual respondents. Next, it answers three 
questions: (i) Which disasters are organizations worried about? (ii) What mitigation and 
preparedness activities do organizations typically engage in? (iii) Do organizations use 
disaster information in decision-making? Then, it presents the results of the bivariate 
analysis and the Tobit regression, which answers the question “what are the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” Chapter IV concludes by 
discussing the results of the Heckman approach, the specification tests and results of 
other additional analyses.   
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations of this study. It begins 
by reiterating the research questions and summarizing the results. Next, it discusses the 
findings in the context of previous research and examines the policy implications of the 
results. Chapter V ends by discussing some limitations and recommendations for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This chapter begins by discussing the controversies surrounding the definition of 
disaster and enumerates some examples of past disasters and their estimated losses. Then 
it presents a review of disaster research at the organizational level and an overview of 
emergency management in the United States. Next, it discusses the importance of 
organizational survival, the determinants of mitigation and preparedness, and 
organizational obstacles. The chapter concludes with background information on 
Memphis. 
 
Disaster: A Controversial Concept 
The word “disaster” is a complicated (Quarantelli, 1985) and vague (Kreps, 1984, 
1985) concept. Establishing a clear conceptualization of an issue is important for public 
policy (Dynes & Drabek, 1994). For example, a clear understanding of the word disaster 
can provide guidance on proper classification of particular historical events as disasters 
(Kreps, 1985). Proper categorization is vital in policymaking, such as in disaster 
declarations and dispatching resources for response and recovery. Similarly, in 
organizations, an unambiguous understanding of the definition of disasters has 
implications for decision-making. For instance, having a clear understanding of what 
constitutes disaster would enable organizations to know the appropriate mitigation and 
preparedness measures to adopt, e.g., whether or not to tie down business equipment. In 
addition, it is important to have a good definition of disasters in order to improve data 
gathering and analysis (Quarantelli, 2003), be able to generalize the findings of disaster 
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research (Stallings, 2006), and advance theoretical understanding of disaster research 
(Quarantelli, 1985, 2003).  The need for a clear conceptualization and definition of 
disaster is important in the disaster management literature that disaster researchers have 
spent much time on defining this concept (e.g., Kreps, 1984, 1985; Quarantelli, 1985, 
1987; Auf der Heide, 1989; Mileti, 1999; Perry, 2006; Gerber, 2007).  Furthermore, the 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters devoted an issue to discussing 
disasters in 1995 (Mileti, 1999). The question-what is a disaster?-Has received much 
attention from disaster researchers, especially after the publication of Quarantelli’s 
(1987) presidential address to the International Research Committee on Disasters. Before 
then, disaster researchers have generally avoided this topic (Quarantelli, 1985). Despite 
the attention and avoidance, there is no consensus on its definition and conceptualization 
(Quarantelli, 1985, 1987), to the extent that Quarantelli (1987) stated that disaster 
research might be at the threshold of a possible paradigmatic revolution. The following 
paragraph discusses some definitions of disasters to highlight the differences in meaning 
and conceptualization. 
According to Perry (2006), one can trace early definition of disaster to the work 
of Carr (1932). Carr defines disaster as the “collapse of cultural protections” (Carr, 1932 
p 211). This perspective sees disasters as a negative consequence event, a view still in 
existence today (Perry, 2006). Fritz defines disasters as “…an event, concentrated in time 
and space, in which a society or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, 
undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical 
appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of 
essential function of the society is prevented.” Cited in Quarantelli (1987 p 655). 
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According to Mileti (1999), most people agreed with Fritz’s definition of disasters until 
recently when opinion began to diverge. The deviation has led to other definitions of 
disasters. For instance, Quarantelli (1985) views a disaster as an event in which the 
demand for action exceeds the capacity to respond. This perspective treats disasters as 
social “occasions” (Quarantelli, 1985 p 50). Nigg (1996) argues that social scientists 
define disaster based on social disruption and not on physical characteristics. She sees 
disasters occurring only “when the built and social environments are so disrupted that the 
resources of the social system are overwhelmed and the system is unable to meet the 
demands placed on it for goods and services that are routinely expected by its citizens” 
(Nigg, 1996 p 5). As a way forward, Quarantelli (1987) notes, among other suggestions, 
that having consensus on one definition of disaster is not important;  clarity of the term 
and what the term refers to when the word is used are what is important. In the same vein, 
Perry (2006) recommends having a classification system that the disaster community can 
scrutinize with the goal of attaining some consensus (Perry, 2006).   
My goal is neither to provide a final definition and conceptualization of this 
controversial word, nor to settle conceptual disagreements. Rather, the goal is to 
recognize the complexities and controversies surrounding the word and acknowledge the 
commendable efforts of disaster researchers on this topic.  Recall that this study defines 
disasters as events, such as floods or earthquakes, which lead to major organizational 
disruption, loss of life, or property destruction. There are two important things to note 
about this definition. First, it emphasizes the unit of analysis, the organization. By 
incorporating the level of analysis in the definition of disaster, this study establishes a 
common context for respondent organizations. Second, this definition emphasizes 
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property damage and number of injured and fatalities in accordance to some definitions 
in the disaster literature (e.g., Kreps, 1984; Rotanz, 2007). Incorporating these 
components- property damage and number of injured and fatalities are a useful way of 
defining disasters to the target audience, the Memphis/Shelby County organizational 
representatives. Although, some disaster researchers disagree on the basis that using 
property damage and number of casualties and injured as criteria for defining disaster 
may be misleading (e.g., Auf der Heide, 1989).  
 
Disasters as “Acts of God” or “Acts of Men” 
There is a literature on disasters that focuses on the distinctions between natural 
and man-made/technological disasters (e.g., Quarantelli, 1987; Dynes & Drabek, 1994). 
Quarantelli (1987) provides a good historical account of disasters and traces the sources 
of disasters-to the stars, God, nature, men and women, and to society. The initial 
understanding of disasters was that they are “acts of God” (Dynes & Drabek, 1994 p 6). 
The occurrence of myriad natural disasters prompted many communities to see 
industrialization and technological advancements as solutions to the problems created by 
disasters (ibid). For instance, communities built dams to address flooding caused by 
natural systems. Unfortunately, technological solutions led to increased development and 
subsequently more disasters (ibid). This led to the realization that disasters may be 
“natural or technological” (Dynes & Drabek, 1994 p 7) / “acts of men” (Quarantelli, 1987 
p 9).  
I do not distinguish between natural or technological/man-made disasters because 
this study is about the determinants of mitigation and preparedness not about the causes 
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of disasters. Although, some may argue that the causes of disasters can affect how 
organizations mitigate and prepare for them. In other words, some organizations may 
mitigate differently depending on whether a disaster is natural or man-made. This study 
assumes that the distinction between natural and man-made disasters is not relevant in 
understanding the determinants of mitigation and preparedness.  
 
Expected Losses from Disasters 
Researchers have documented the pernicious nature of disasters (e.g., Auf de 
Heide, 1989). The following examples highlight the monumental losses that can result 
from disasters. The Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 caused 62 deaths, injured 3,757 
people, displaced over 20,000 people, destroyed 18,306 homes and businesses, and 
caused over 6 billion dollars in economic losses (Mileti & O’Brien, 1992).   The 
September 11 terrorist attacks caused 2973 fatalities (The 9/11 Commission Report, 
2004). The estimate of economic losses from Hurricane Katrina is over $200 billion 
(Burby, 2006). The Midwest floods of June 2008 caused 24 fatalities, injuries to 150 
people, destroyed 40,000 properties and 5 million acres of agricultural land (Munich 
Reinsurance Group, 2008). While these costs vary by year, a new study by FEMA in 
2006 indicates that the Annual Estimated Losses (AEL) to the national building stock is 
$5.3 billion (FEMA, 2007). In the first six months of 2008, the United States has suffered 
154 fatalities and about $20.3 billion in estimated total losses to disasters (Munich 
Reinsurance Group, 2008). Evidence from the disaster literature (e.g., Mileti, 1999; 
Waugh, 2000) and the insurance community (e.g., Munich Reinsurance Group, 2008) 
suggest continued increases in losses from disasters. The reasons for the expected 
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increases include but not limited to rising population density, more settlements in high-
risk areas, and increases in technological risks (Auf der Heide, 1989). 
 
Disaster Research at the Organizational Level: The Need for More 
Extensive and systematic disaster research began in the early 1950s (Quarantelli, 
2003). The focus then was on how individuals, households, communities, and public 
organizations like fire and police departments responded in the aftermath of disasters 
(Tierney, 1997). The field of disaster research has expanded since then, with increased 
growth in research at the individual, household, community, and public sector 
organizational levels (Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). In fact, many studies in the 
disaster management literature focus either on household surveys (e.g., Jackson, 1981; 
Davis, 1989; Dooley et al., 1992; Edwards, 1993; Farley, 1998; Atwood & Major, 2000) 
or on surveys of policy elite active in a community (e.g., Drabek et al., 1983; Mushkatel 
& Nigg, 1987; Berke & Beatley, 1992; May & Birkland, 1994; Burby et al., 2000; Wood, 
2004). Unfortunately, disaster researchers have largely neglected the organizational level 
(Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 2000).  
Tierney (1997) points out that in the last five years, notable disaster journals and 
crisis management journals have few articles on organizations and disasters. The few 
available articles focused on how public-sector organizations are dealing with a particular 
disaster and not on how the disaster affected businesses (ibid). The emergence of some 
journals (e.g., Disaster Recovery and Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management), 
provides hope for more disaster research on organizations. While these journals are 
replete with useful information on disasters, many of their articles do not contain 
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information on the determinants of organizational preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 
1997) and many focus on single case studies and not on large-scale systematic research 
(Tierney, 1997). Single cases are not appropriate for generalizing findings from disaster 
research (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). The field of organizations has the potential of 
providing information on businesses and disasters. However, according to Tierney (1997) 
much of this literature deals with how to manage complex systems. Although, this 
literature is quite useful, its focuses on rare catastrophic events (e.g. Perrow, 1984), thus 
making it difficult to generalize findings to typical organizations. The neglect of disaster 
research at the organizational level may be because organizations are difficult to sample 
and survey in large numbers; the theoretical lines of inquiry usually direct research 
activities toward disaster awareness and response among regular citizen or among 
decision makers; and, some organizations are afraid of the potential consequences of 
divulging disaster information (Auf der Heide, 1989). 
There is a body of disaster research at the business/organizational level on disaster 
recovery (e.g., Durkin, 1984; Kroll et al., 1991; Tierney et al., 1996; Dahlhamer & 
Tierney, 1998; Alesch et al., 2001). Some of these post-disaster studies have examined 
how disasters affect businesses in the short-term (e.g., Dahlhamer, 1998; Dahlhamer & 
Tierney, 1998) or the longer-term (e.g., W ebb et al., 1999). Others have studied 
programs aimed at helping businesses in disasters, such as the Small Business 
Administration loan (e.g., French et al., 1984; Dahlhamer, 1992). This federal loan 
provides financial assistance to small businesses affected by disasters. These studies are 
useful for providing insights into why some organizations survive and others do not. 
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Unfortunately, they cannot tell us about the determinants of mitigation and preparedness 
at the organizational level.  
A body of pre-disaster research at the organizational level is beginning to emerge 
due to the foundational work of some eminent researchers like Quarantelli, Lawrence, 
Tierney and Johnson. This group of researchers examined how chemical companies and 
government agencies in 18 U.S. communities plan for chemical emergencies (Quarantelli 
et al., 1979). A few years later Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b) investigated how businesses 
in the tourism industry carry out evacuation planning. Mileti et al. (1993) studied how 54 
businesses in eight San Francisco counties adopt earthquake preparedness measures. 
Further, Barlow (1993) investigated the impact of Iben Browning earthquake prediction 
on 20 businesses in the St. Louis area. Dahlhamer & D’ Souza (1997) investigated the 
determinants of business disaster preparedness in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee 
and Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa.  Webb et al. (2000) used a series of surveys to 
explore the preparedness and disaster experiences of businesses in different parts of the 
country, including Memphis, Tennessee. Aside from the Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) 
and the Webb et al. (2000) studies, no other disaster study in Memphis used systematic 
method of data collection to gather disaster information from typical organizations of 
various sizes representing different industries. 
 
Overview of the United States Emergency Management System 
In this section, I take a brief look at the history, phases, and the status quo of 
emergency management, especially the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on emergency 
management in the United States. The United States emergency management system 
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developed in response to particular disasters with no capacity building to address the next 
disaster (Waugh, 2000). Since fire and flood have been the most common disasters in the 
United States, these disasters are the basis of the national emergency management system 
policies (ibid).  
Before the 1900s, there were no organized responses to disasters; when disasters 
occur, individuals simply carried out response activities themselves, or sometimes with 
the help of family members and neighbors (Rubin, 2007). Volunteer fire brigades and 
people close to fire outbreaks battled fires using buckets and shovels (Waugh, 2000; 
Rubin, 2007). With more fire outbreaks, the number of volunteers available and the level 
of expertise became inadequate thus, leading to the establishment of professional fire 
departments in many communities (Rubin, 2007). The occurrence of major natural 
disasters that spanned many states prompted the federal government to create national 
level organizations, like the National Weather Service, consequently, paving the way for 
planned and systematic approaches to emergency management (ibid). The occurrence of 
major disasters in the 1900s (e.g., 1900 Galveston hurricane, the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake, and the great Mississippi flood of 1927) overwhelmed individual capability 
to respond, thus leading to more governmental roles in disaster response (ibid). The 
federal government’s increased interest in emergency management led to the passage of 
the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which gave the federal government the authority to make 
disaster declarations (Waugh, 2000). The federal government was also interested in civil 
defense, particularly during the World War II. As a result, the federal government created 
the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (ibid). This act became even more relevant during 
the cold war with the Soviet Union. Amid the cold war, major disasters-Alaska 
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earthquake in 1964, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, Hurricane 
Agnes in 1972, Three Mile Island nuclear mishap in 1979-drew public attention (ibid) 
and exposed the fragility of the current emergency management system (Rubin, 2007). 
Pressures from various quarters prompted President Jimmy Carter to create the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1978 (Waugh, 2000). FEMA is the lead 
agency for emergencies in the United States and responsible for coordinating disaster 
efforts with states, local emergency, and nongovernmental agencies.  
Although, disasters often wreak havoc whenever and wherever they occur, they 
provide us with lessons that can help to sinew our national emergency management 
system. One such disaster is the 9/11 terrorist attacks which changed the world of 
emergency management (Tierney, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Waugh, 2007). These attacks have 
altered the social and political context of emergency management (Waugh, 2007), so 
much so that Tierney (2006, p 406) describes the attacks of 9/11 as the “ultimate focusing 
event”. Two vivid examples of social changes are the contracting out of emergency 
management services to private and nonprofit organizations and the increased 
participation of local governments in emergency management decisions (Waugh, 2007). 
On the political side, the most visible change is that FEMA was subsumed under the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2003 (Tierney, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Waugh, 2007). 
This reorganization has led to diminished capabilities to deal with natural disasters 
(Waugh, 2006; Gerber, 2007). For instance, the reorganization has resulted in the 
diversion of financial and human resources from other threats, such as hurricanes to 
securing the homeland (Tierney, 2006; Waugh, 2007).   
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According to Waugh (2000), the National Governors’ Association developed the 
“all hazard” approach in the early 1970s (FEMA adopted this model afterwards). The 
assumption of this model is that disasters have some elements in common. Therefore, the 
expectation is that local, state, and federal emergency programs and policies can take 
advantage of the similarities by developing generic responses for different hazards. 
Emergency managers can design similar warning systems and use the same mass 
evacuation plan for different disasters. For example, local shelters could serve as a place 
of refuge for both earthquake and hurricane victims.  Waugh (2004) enumerates some 
advantages of the “all hazards” approach-it reduces cost and saves time, standardizes 
some aspects of the four phases, provides a framework for organizing our thinking, easy 
to remember and follow during emergencies, and creates opportunities for risk managers 
to have broader perspectives on hazards and disasters. On the contrary, it may be 
sometimes difficult to identify common elements among the four phases for all types of 
disasters or emergencies. For instance, preparing for pandemic flu may have little or no 
similarities with preparing for an earthquake due to the air-borne nature of the former.  
The all-hazard model divides all emergency management programs and policies 
into four activities: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Waugh, 2000). 
These four activities or phases constitute the disaster policy cycle (May, 1986). 
Mitigation includes those activities aimed at preventing or reducing losses from disasters 
(Waugh, 2000).  These activities can be structural or non-structural. Structural mitigation 
activities include adopting building codes, building levees and including surveillance 
equipment in buildings to prevent terrorist attacks (ibid). Non-structural mitigation 
measures include instituting land-use regulations and zoning ordinances to prevent people 
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from building in floodplains. Preparedness is planning for response purposes and 
developing effective response capabilities before an emergency or disaster occurs (ibid).  
It encompasses all actions taken to allow social units to respond after disasters (Tierney et 
al., 2001). Preparedness activities include training responders, establishing warning 
systems, developing contingency plans, and acquiring equipment and supplies. Response 
entails reacting immediately to disasters or emergencies (Waugh, 2000). Response 
activities include detecting threats, issuing warnings, evacuating threatened populations 
(Tierney et al., 2001), supplying water to victims, covering building rooftops, providing 
shelter, and providing medical services. Recovery, which is typically the one-year after a 
disaster deals with long time restoration of a disaster-stricken community after an 
emergency or disaster (Fothergill & Peek, 2004). Recovery activities include restoring 
lifelines like power and telephones, providing counseling for responders, making small 
loans available for victims, removing debris, and facilitating long-term reconstruction of 
homes and businesses. 
 
Disasters and Organizational Survival 
 An organization is “a social unit with some particular purposes” (Shafritz et al., 
2005 p 1). One of the fundamental goals of organizations is survival (ibid).The survival 
of organizations is very important so much so that organizational theorists have devoted 
much time to studying how organizations manage to survive (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Acquisition and maintenance of resources are vital to organizational survival 
(Alesch & Petak, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Because no organization is self reliant, 
every organization must transact with its external environment for needed resources 
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(ibid).  However, the external environment is not dependable and may sometimes 
threaten the survival of organizations. Disasters may cause organizational disruption 
(Lindell & Perry, 2007), loss of sales and property taxes (Tierney, 1994), and loss of 
services from public organizations and nonprofits, consequently, undermining the 
economy and support systems of communities (Lindell & Perry, 2007). For instance, 
earthquakes may destroy lifelines, like major highways, on which organizations depend 
for transporting raw materials and rendering services. Organizations cannot control the 
physical characteristics of disasters, such as magnitude and frequency (Nigg, 1996); they 
can however, reduce their impacts.  Organizations can ameliorate disaster impacts by 
engaging in a number of mitigation and preparedness measures (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 
1997). In order to ensure survival, organizations should evaluate their vulnerability to 
various disasters and take appropriate preparedness and mitigation steps accordingly. In 
so doing, organizations would stand a better chance of remaining open and continuing 
their day-to-day operations during and after disasters. 
 
The Importance of Mitigation and Preparedness 
Mitigation and preparedness are crucial to the design of effective disaster policies 
(May, 1986). Mitigation and preparedness are important to society both practically (to 
organizations and the emergency management community) and theoretically (to the 
academic community). First, mitigation and preparedness can make it easier for 
organizations to survive disasters by providing opportunities to lessen their severity. For 
example, before an earthquake, it is possible to institute building codes that will help to 
strengthen buildings. Once an earthquake occurs, it will be too late to carry out this 
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measure. Similarly, organizations with effective contingency plans and warning systems 
would stand a better chance of survival than organizations without these preparedness 
measures. Second, if organizations have mitigation and preparedness strategies in place, 
they are likely to be less reliant on emergency responders, thus freeing up resources for 
other purposes. It is important to emphasize here that effective mitigation and 
preparedness programs and policies for disasters do not preclude the need for emergency 
responders. Third, mitigation and preparedness can help to lay a solid foundation for 
effective disaster response (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997) and serve as a first step in 
understanding recovery in organizations. In other words, mitigation and preparedness can 
assist researchers in understanding why some organizations fail and others survive 
disasters. For instance, researchers may gather pre-disaster information from a particular 
sample of organizations on mitigation and preparedness and then examine the same 
organizations post-disaster to understand the mitigation and preparedness strategies that 
were instrumental to survival and those that were not. 
 
Determinants of Mitigation and Preparedness in Organizations 
The overall objective of this section is to review the literature on the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness in organizations. Due to limited studies on this topic, 
much of the information will emanate from the literature on how households and 
organizations mitigate and prepare for disasters.  
A major preoccupation for researchers and practitioners involved in disaster 
management is developing an understanding of the factors leading to the adoption of 
mitigation and preparedness measures. At the household level, mitigation and 
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preparedness activities might include purchasing earthquake insurance, shutting off 
utilities, developing emergency plans, buying first aid kits, and storing food and water 
(e.g., Davis, 1989; Mileti & O’Brien, 1992; Edward, 1993; Farley et al., 1993).  At the 
community level or policy subsystem level, they might include building codes, zoning 
ordinances, and land use planning (e.g., Olshansky, 1994; Flynn et al., 1999).  
Organizations can also engage in a number of mitigation and preparedness activities, 
such as bracing shelves and equipment, purchasing earthquake or flood insurance, 
developing an emergency plan, buying generators, and storing supplies (Dahlhamer & 
D’Souza, 1997).  
At the household level of analysis, many disaster researchers have focused on the 
determinants of preparedness and mitigation. At this level, the story is clear; household 
preparedness depends, among other determinants on presence of children (Edwards, 
1993), marital status (Dooley et al., 1992), education (Edwards, 1993; Bourque et al., 
2006), concern about a disaster (Dooley et al., 1992), household income (Edwards, 1993; 
Bourque et al., 2006), and length of residence (Dooley et al., 1992). At the organizational 
level, the determinants are ambiguous and the number of research is limited. Some 
scholars have recognized the dearth of studies in this area and have called for more 
research on disaster preparedness and mitigation at the organizational level (e.g., Drabek, 
1986; Dynes & Drabek, 1994). Drabek (1986) came to this conclusion after his review of 
the disaster literature unearthed only a few disaster studies on organizational disaster 
preparedness. He argues that more research in this field would enable disaster researchers 
document the determinants of disaster planning within the private sector (ibid). Some 
researchers have heeded Drabek’s call. About a decade ago, Dahlhamer & D’Souza 
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(1997) studied the determinants of business disaster preparedness in Memphis/Shelby 
County, Tennessee and Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa. A few years later, Webb et al. 
(2000) used a series of surveys to explore the preparedness and recovery experiences of 
businesses in different parts of the country, including Memphis, Tennessee.  The 
following paragraphs discuss the determinants of mitigation and preparedness in 
organizations. 
Firm size is the most consistent (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997) and important 
(Webb et al., 2000) predictor of organizational mitigation and preparedness in studies 
conducted by the Disaster Research Center (DRC). Past studies suggest that larger firms 
do more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than do smaller firms. For example, in their 
study of 18 chemical companies, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that larger companies 
were more likely to engage in more planning than smaller companies did. Similarly, in a 
study of disaster evacuation planning in the tourist industry, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 
1994b) found that firms with more employees had more extensive disaster evacuation 
plans than firms with less employees. Some researchers interpreted this relationship in 
the context of resource availability; the argument is that larger firms have more resources 
to devote to disaster mitigation and preparedness than smaller firms do. Such a resource 
argument is common in the literature on disasters at the household (Mileti, 1999), 
community (May & Birkland, 1994; Wood, 2004), and organizational level (Mileti et al., 
1993; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Tierney, 2006).  
The next determinant is previous disaster experience. In a study of business 
preparedness among 20 St. Louis businesses, Barlow (1993) found that previous disaster 
experience was the best predictor of business preparedness. Similarly, Drabek (1994a, 
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1994b) found that businesses with more disaster experience engaged in more disaster 
evacuation planning than those with little or no experience of a disaster.  
Another determinant of organizational mitigation and preparedness is own or 
lease business property. Although, this determinant has been found to be related to 
household preparedness (e.g., Turner et al., 1986), it has only been examined in relation 
to business preparedness about a decade ago by Dahlhamer & D’Souza (1997). These 
researchers found that businesses that owned their properties were more likely than those 
that leased their properties to engage in more preparedness. This result makes sense 
because owners of a business property would be more interested in the survival of the 
property than lessees would (Webb et al., 2000). In addition, owners of a property have 
the legal authority to make changes to it. For instance, the owner of a building can make 
structural changes, while a lessee would not have the legal authority to make such 
changes.  
Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that some sectors engage in more 
mitigation and preparedness than others do. For instance, Drabek (1991, 1995) found that 
there was a significant relationship between business type and disaster evacuation 
planning, with lodging businesses having more extensive disaster evacuation plans than 
restaurants, entertainment businesses, and firms in the travel industry. Similarly, in their 
study of 54 firms on preparedness for earthquakes in San Francisco, Mileti et al. (1993) 
found an indirect relationship between firm type and earthquake preparedness. Further, 
Dahlhamer & D’Souza (1997) found that businesses in the finance, insurance, and real 
estate, do more to prepare for disasters than businesses in other sectors. One reason for 
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this finding is the higher degree of regulation and oversight in this sector (Webb et al., 
2000). 
The age of an organization is the next determinant of interest. Drabek (1991) 
found that firms that have been in existence for at least six years were more likely to have 
more extensive disaster evacuation plans than younger firms were. On the contrary, 
Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that newer chemical firms were more likely than were 
older chemical firms to prepare for disasters.  In sum, the findings regarding the effect of 
age on organizational preparedness are inconsistent (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). 
 Evidence in disaster research suggests that high level of concern over disaster 
impacts, such as loss of life and personal injury, may induce individuals to engage in 
preparedness activities (Nigg, 1986). In her study of the effect of the Iben Browning 
earthquake prediction, Showalter (1993) found a positive relationship between concern 
over loss of life and personal injury and respondents’ willingness to engage in 
preparedness activities. There is a body of research on risk and disaster visualizations, 
which suggests that information on the potential impacts of disasters can motivate people 
to reduce their risks (e.g., Sandman, et al., 1994). 
Ownership pattern implies whether an organization is a single firm or a franchise. 
Empirical evidence suggests that franchises do more to mitigate and prepare for disasters 
than single firms. For instance, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995) found that firms that 
were part of a larger chain engaged in more disaster evacuation planning than single 
firms did.  This finding is in line with that of Quarantelli et al. (1979), who found that 
national chemical companies engaged in more preparedness than single local chemical 
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firms did. This finding may be due to the mandates given to local chapters by corporate 
headquarters to engage in disaster preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). 
Organizational obstacles  
Both internal and external obstacles confront organizations. This study focuses on 
internal organizational obstacles to disaster mitigation and preparedness, while 
recognizing that there are external organizational obstacles as well, such as competition 
from other organizations. By internal organizational obstacle, I mean factors inside the 
organization that inhibit organizations’ ability to mitigate and prepare for disasters. For 
instance, lack of information on disasters can impede the adoption of mitigation and 
preparedness activities by organizations. This study examines three types of internal 
organizational obstacles and their relationship to mitigation and preparedness (i) lack of 
information (ii) lack of management and organizational members’ support, and (iii) lack 
of financial resources. Because I consider internal obstacles only, the word “obstacle” 
implies internal organizational obstacles.  
Information  
Disasters can sometimes be beyond human control. We can however, mitigate and 
prepare using an important ingredient, the acquisition of information (Major, 1998). For 
instance, in making the choice to allocate resources toward disaster mitigation and 
preparedness, organizations need information about possible damages of potential 
disasters. This study does recognize that mere availability of information does not 
automatically guarantee the adoption of mitigation and preparedness activities by an 
organization. There may need to be changes in the belief of organizational members or 
changes in the political status quo, which may take several years to occur (Sabatier, 
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1999).  This study refers to any information that is suppose to help or has the potential to 
help organizations mitigate and prepare for disasters as “disaster-related information”. 
Disaster-related information can be in the form of hurricane, earthquake, and flood, 
forecasts. For example, hurricane forecasts can provide organizations with information on 
the path of a hurricane. Organizations can obtain disaster-related information from 
representatives of federal, state, and local governments, nonprofits, private sector, and 
research institutions. The disaster management literature has focused much on the role of 
information in household preparedness for earthquakes. Information on earthquake risks 
can induce households to take preparatory action (Jackson & Mukerjee 1974; Sullivan et 
al., 1977; Palm, 1981; Turner, 1983; Russell et al., 1995; Flynn et al., 1999; Atwood & 
Major, 2000; Celsi et al., 2005).  A notable example is the impact of Iben Browning’s 
forecast that a major earthquake in the NMSZ would occur around December 3, 1990 
(e.g., Farley et al., 1993; Showalter, 1993; Atwood & Major, 2000). This prediction led to 
an increase in household preparedness (Farley et al., 1993) and made households more 
prepared for future earthquakes (Showalter, 1993).  I grouped the following three 
obstacles under lack of information: lack of information about the frequency and 
magnitude of disasters, lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of 
disasters, and unclear organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation. 
Management Support  
Researchers have documented the pivotal role policy entrepreneurs or champions 
play in the policymaking process (e.g., Kingdon, 1984; Prater & Lindell, 2000; Wood, 
2004; Olshansky, 2005). These entrepreneurs are willing to, among other strategies, 
mobilize support for their issues if necessary (Berke & Beatley, 1992). Support is just as 
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important in organizations as it is in the policymaking arena. For instance, the support of 
upper level management is crucial in the adoption of mitigation and preparedness 
measures. In order to make structural changes to an organization’s building, the support 
of upper level management is paramount. This study is interested in knowing whether 
organizations consider lack of support from upper-level management and lack of support 
from mid- and lower-level organizational members as obstacles to disaster planning. 
Financial Resources 
Mitigating and preparing for disasters require time, money, and effort (Wyner & 
Mann, 1986). Lack of financial and technical resources can constrain the adoption of 
earthquake mitigation policies (Bostrom et al., 2006).  This study focuses on whether 
organizations consider lack of financial resources as an obstacle to disaster planning. 
  
Study Location: Memphis/Shelby County and Disasters 
Memphis is the largest city in Tennessee with a population of about 650 thousand 
people. Its location on the banks of the Mississippi River provides access to river 
navigation and protection from pernicious floods. Earthquakes are a big disaster risk in 
the Memphis area due to the hazard posed by the New Madrid Fault Zone. The three 
most powerful earthquakes in the United States (magnitude 7.0-8.1) occurred in the 
NMSZ (Memphis/Shelby County were not a settlement then) between December 16, 
1811 and February 7, 1812 (United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2008a).  While 
many dispute the characterization of the risk, USGS (1998) estimated that there is more 
than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake (magnitude 6-7) hitting the NMSZ within 
the next 50 years. In comparison to California, the USGS (2008b) notes that the odds of a 
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magnitude 6.7 or larger earthquake in the next 30 years in California is more than 99 
percent. In general, the seismic risks from the NMSZ are of low probability and high 
consequences (Olshansky, 1994).  
Still, Memphis faces threats from other disasters, such as floods, tornadoes, ice 
storms, chemical spills, fires, severe storms, violent crimes, and toxic releases. For 
instance, on July 22, 2003 a windstorm (later called Hurricane Elvis) left over 300,000 
utility consumers in the dark; it took two weeks to restore power for everyone (Shepard, 
2003).  
A study of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County makes for an interesting 
case for several reasons. The rarity of major earthquakes (magnitude 7.0 or greater) in 
Memphis/Shelby County in recent time poses challenges for organizations in deciding to 
mitigate and prepare. The occurrence of major earthquakes (what Birkland, 1997, refers 
to as focusing event) can induce organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness 
measures. Absence of such disasters makes organizations apathetic and reluctant to adopt 
such measures (May, 1986; Lindell & Perry, 2007).  In addition, a vast majority of 
studies on earthquakes and disasters exist on the west coast and, especially, California 
(e.g., Jackson & Mukerjee, 1974; Kiecolt & Nigg, 1982; Mulilis & Duval, 1995; 
Argothy, 2003; May & Wood, 2003; Wood, 2004; Celsi et al., 2005). Very few studies 
have analyzed responses to disaster risks in Memphis (e.g., Edwards, 1993) and few in 
the NMSZ where risks have low probabilities and high consequences (e.g., Mushkatel & 
Nigg, 1987; Olshansky, 1994; Farley, 1998; Major, 1998; Atwood & Major, 2000). 
Finally, studies on organizational preparedness suggest that organizations in 
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Memphis/Shelby County do little to prepare for disasters (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 
1997; Webb et al., 2000). 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
The goal of this chapter is to present the methodology of this study. It begins with 
the procedure for data collection and the strengths and limitations of the data. Then it 
presents a model of organizational mitigation and preparedness, the dependent and 
independent variables, the hypotheses to be tested, and the estimation techniques. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the Heckman approach to sample selection and a 
brief discussion of sample representativeness. 
 
Data Collection 
The data used in this study comes from the collective effort of a group of 
researchers and graduate students (I was one of the graduate students) studying the 
influence of organizational structures on earthquake decision-making in Memphis/Shelby 
County, Tennessee. I will refer to this data as the organizational survey data and this 
group of researchers as the research team.  
The research team collected disaster information from a stratified random sample 
of public, private, and non-profit organizations involved in disaster risk issues and 
organizations that a major disaster will significantly affect. The target organizations 
included, but were not limited to utility companies, schools, health facilities, chemical 
companies, pharmaceutical companies, financial institutions, religious institutions, 
transportation, and restaurants. The data gathering procedure occurred in two phases: 
Interview phase and survey phase. In addition to these two methods, the research team 
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used publicly available documents and reports, such as newspaper articles. Table 3.1 
shows the research schedule, which started in fall 2005 and ended in spring 2007. 
Table 3.1. Research schedule 
 
Task Schedule 
Analyze publicly available documents and reports Fall 2005-Spring 2007 
Identify stakeholders, private and public organizations Fall 2005 
Develop interview instrument and conduct interviews  
with organizational representative(s) Spring 2006 
Develop survey instrument and conduct surveys Summer 2006-Fall 2006 
Analyze data Fall 2006-Spring 2007 
Prepare stakeholder report Spring 2007 
 
Interview Phase 
In this phase, the research team conducted 15 exploratory interviews with 15 
different organizations in Memphis/Shelby County in the spring and summer of 2006. 
The interviews consisted of open-ended interview questions, conducted in person or via 
telephone with the professional managers in the offices of their organizations. Interview 
questions addressed attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk information, as 
well as organizational actions with respect to risk. The interviews took approximately 30-
60 minutes each. The research team typed up the interviews and sent them back to the 
interviewees to ensure the accuracy of the information provided. 
Survey Phase 
This phase consisted of a survey administered in fall 2006. The interviews 
informed the survey questions, which were in two parts. The first part consists of 
questions regarding risk issues in organizations, such as availability of risk managers, 
amount of resources devoted to disaster planning, level of disaster concern, use of 
disaster information, impacts of disasters, engagement in mitigation and preparedness 
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activities, sources of disaster information, and obstacles to disaster planning. The second 
part deals with demographic information about organizational representatives that 
answered the surveys, such as age, length of residence in Memphis/Shelby County, 
duration in current position within the organization, and educational level.  
With the help of the Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce, the research 
team queried an online reference service, ReferenceUSA using “number of employees” as 
a key index variable. Since the number of organizations in categories with less than 100 
employees far exceeded the number of organizations in categories with hundreds of 
employee, the research team stratified the population by employee size to allow 
organizations of all sizes in the Memphis Metropolitan Area to be surveyed and 
represented in sufficient numbers to analyze. There were 11 categories, which ranged 
from one employee to over 9999 employees. The research team re-categorized “number 
of employees” into seven categories-(1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, and 
≥500). The research team sampled 100 organizations from the first 6 categories and 
sampled the entire population of 101 organizations from the last category, and added 32 
utility companies to make 733 organizations.  
The research team delivered the surveys following a modification of Dillman’s 
total design method (Dillman, 2000). Dillman’s method emphasizes a systematic series of 
remailings and follow-ups to achieve an optimum response rate (ibid). This method is 
common among disaster researchers (e.g., Palm, et al., 1990; Edwards, 1993; Showalter, 
1993; Tierney, 2000). The research team mailed a letter on University letterhead to each 
of the 733 organizations. This letter described the study and sought their participation.  
The research team then mailed the first batch of surveys and followed-up with postcards, 
 32 
and then the second batch of surveys. The research team received organizational 
characteristics recorded in ReferenceUSA, such as name, address, city, and Zip Code. The 
research team removed all identifying information (including names and addresses) and 
duplicates from this dataset and merged it with information from the survey to generate 
the organizational survey data. Table 3.2 shows all the organizational characteristics and 
their descriptions. 
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Table 3.2. Organizational characteristics and their descriptions 
 
Organizational Characteristic Description 
NAME Company Name 
ADDRESS Address of company 
CITY City location of company 
ST State location of company 
ZIPCODE Zip code 
ZIP4 Postal code for geographic segment 
COUNTY County location of company 
MSA Metropolitan Service Area 
PHONE Phone number 
FAX  Fax number 
EMP_SIZE Number of employees 
SALES Category for amount of sales 
BUS_STATUS Branch, single location, subsidiary 
PARENT_COMPANY_NAME Name of company that owns business 
LASTNAME Last Name of person liable 
FIRSTNAME First Name of person in liable 
TITLECODE Title of person liable 
GENDER Male or female 
CREDIT_RATING Companies credit rating – descriptive 
category 
URL Internet address 
NAICS North American Industry Classification 
System 
NAICS_DESCRIPTION Type of Company 
CREDIT_RATING_SCORE Credit rating scale based on alphabet 
CREDIT_NUMERIC_SCORE Numeric credit score 
SQUARE_FOOTAGE Physical space of building in square feet 
OWN_OR_LEASE Site owned or leased 
WORK-AT-HOME Home based business 
YEAR_ESTABLISHED Year business was established 
LATITUDE Latitude coordinates 
LONGITUDE Longitude coordinates 
PSICCODE Primary Standard Industrial 
Classification Code 
PRIMARY_SIC_DESCRIPTION Description of Standard Industrial 
Classification Code 
 
Source: Adapted from ReferenceUSA 
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Of the 733 organizations, 227 Memphis/Shelby County organizations returned the 
survey, giving a response rate of about 31% (10 organizations declined to participate in 
the study for various reasons, e.g. business is not fully operational and due to private 
nature of business). Although, this response rate may appear low, there is evidence that 
similar response rates are common in disaster research. For instance, Showalter’s (1993) 
earthquake study at the household level obtained a response rate of 30%. Some 
researchers actually think a response rate of 30% is high in earthquake research (e.g., 
Davis, 1989). The low response could be because the research team addressed the 
surveys to the owners or risk managers of organizations. Owners of organizations, 
especially those whose organization do not have risk managers may not have the time to 
answer our surveys. Nevertheless, what is more important about this response rate is the 
extent to which it provides a balanced sample of the original population, which I discuss 
later in this study. 
In addition to the interviews and surveys, the research team analyzed publicly 
available documents and reports. Memphis newspapers were particularly helpful in 
providing historical background on disasters in the Memphis Area. Equally useful were 
the USGS and FEMA reports that provided geologic and historical information on the 
NMSZ. 
Data Strengths and Limitations 
Data Strength  
The organizational survey data is unique in two ways. (i) It contains rare 
information on organizational representatives’ perspective on how their organizations 
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address disaster risks. Getting disaster information on organizations is difficult because 
some organizations are afraid of the potential consequences of divulging such 
information (Auf der Heide, 1998). One of the reasons given for not wanting to answer 
the survey is the fear of divulging information to the public.  In addition, most studies on 
disasters have focused on levels other than organizations (Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 
2000). (ii) It contains information on organizational mitigation and preparedness for 
many types of disasters in a moderate seismic region. The literature on disasters shows 
that there is a tendency for researchers investigating disaster preparedness in 
organizations to focus on specific hazards (Mileti, 1999). Thus, with the exception of the 
Disaster Research Center (DRC) data, there are no other data available, to my knowledge, 
on how organizations are preparing for different types of disasters.  In addition, some 
researchers have surveyed organizations in high seismic regions, like California, only a 
small number of researchers have surveyed organizations in the NMSZ.  
Data Limitation: Internal Validity 
Internal validity refers to the possibility that the conclusions drawn by a study 
may not precisely reflect what went on in that study (Babbie, 2007). Prior to the design of 
the organizational surveys, the research team conducted 15 interviews to understand how 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are coping with disasters. These interviews 
helped the research team understand the issues of interest and the way Memphis 
organizations conceptualize these issues. For instance, the research team gained insights 
on what Memphis/Shelby County organizations understand by the word “disasters”. 
Their understanding of the word seems to emphasize mainly natural disasters like 
earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes. This helped the research team to define relevant 
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concepts properly prior to administering the surveys. However, this study recognizes the 
potential threat to internal validity resulting from testing (ibid). For instance, the 
organizations interviewed, who are among those that answered the survey may give 
biased responses on the survey because they already knew what issues were of interest to 
the research team from the preliminary interviews. Fortunately, the research team 
interviewed only 15 organizations. 
Data Limitation: Data Entry Errors and Reliability 
Reliability relates to questions of stability and consistency (Singleton & Straits, 
1999). Two graduate students, including myself entered and coded the organizational 
survey data separately. The other coder and I resolved a few discrepancies, which were 
mainly typographical in nature. The objective is to make sure that both coders using same 
coding and data entry instruments obtain equivalent results (ibid). 
Data Limitation: Missing Values 
The organizational survey data has a number of missing values: Total number of 
mitigation and preparedness activities (19), disaster impact (21), and organizational 
obstacle (55). I recoded missing values as zeroes for the dependent variable, total number 
of mitigation and preparedness activities. The recoding has implication for interpreting 
this dependent variable when it has a value of zero. A value of zero for this variable now 
represents respondents that did not engage in any mitigation and preparedness activity or 
that did not provide an answer to this question. In addition, I recoded missing values and 
"not applicable" responses as zeros for the independent variables, disaster impact and 
organizational obstacle. Similarly, this recoding changes the way I interpret these 
independent variables when they have a value of zero. A value of zero for both 
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independent variables represent respondents that selected not applicable or respondents 
that did not answer either of the two questions on these independent variables. It does 
seem reasonable to recode not applicable as zero for these independent variables because 
by selecting not applicable, the respondent is indirectly saying that a disaster impact is 
less than “minor disaster impact” or that an organizational obstacle is less than “minor 
obstacle”. In this case, zero is less than “minor disaster impact” and less than “minor 
obstacle”, each of which has a value of one. After the recoding exercise, the sample size 
went up from 146 to 215. Later in this study, I carry out some analyses using 146 and 215 
observations and compare the results. The goal is to ascertain if the recoding has any 
effects on the results.  
Data Limitation: Selection Bias 
One of the potential problems of any survey is selection bias. The organizational 
survey dataset is not immune from this problem. Each organization in the sample 
population (733) may not have an equal chance of answering the survey. For instance, 
organizations that responded to the survey may be those that actually care about disasters 
and may already be mitigating and preparing for disasters. Others not interested in 
disasters and not doing anything to mitigate and prepare may be less apt to answer the 
survey. The implication is that the sample may not be representative of the general 
population of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County. If I run OLS on a sample that 
suffers from selection bias, the sample coefficients will be biased (Giles, 2001). There are 
some ways of addressing selection bias problems including the Heckman’s approach and 
the bounding method. Later in this study, I use the Heckman approach to correct potential 
selection bias problems.  
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Unit of Analysis 
Disaster researchers have studied disasters at levels other than the organization. In 
fact, many studies in the disaster management literature focus either on household 
surveys (e.g., Davis, 1989; Dooley et al., 1992; Edwards, 1993; Farley, 1998; Atwood & 
Major, 2000) or on surveys of policy elites active in a community (e.g., Drabek et al., 
1983; Mushkatel & Nigg, 1987; Berke & Beatley, 1992; May & Birkland, 1994; Burby et 
al., 2000; Wood, 2004). Due to the relative shortage of disaster research at the 
organizational level compared to other levels of analysis, some researchers (e.g., Tierney, 
1997; Webb et al., 2000) have called for more research at the organizational level. The 
unit of analysis in this study is the organization. The potential for organizations to 
mitigate and prepare for disasters is immense. This study recognizes this huge potential 
and hopes to make policy recommendations aimed at capitalizing on the potentials of 
organizations in mitigating and preparing for disasters.  
 
A Model of Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness 
In this section, I present a model of mitigation and preparedness at the 
organizational level of analysis. This model was developed based on prior research on 
business disaster preparedness (e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 
1997; Webb et al., 2000) and earthquake preparedness at the household level (e.g., Nigg, 
1986; Showalter, 1993). This study assumes that the relationships that exist at the 
organizational level between the dependent variable and the independent variables will 
also exist at the household level.  
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Figure 3.1. A model of organizational mitigation and preparedness.  
Source: Author 
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This assumption is reasonable because households and organizations share many 
goals, including survival. This model is a simple representation of the factors that affect 
mitigation and preparedness in organizations and the potential direction of each factor 
(Figure 3.1). Double borders represent independent variables that this study analyzes. 
Single borders represent independent variables that this study does not analyze due to 
unavailability of information (e.g., past disaster experience) and missing values (e.g., 
own business property and age of organization). Efforts to fill the gaps have not yielded 
positive results. For instance, I have visited the websites of some of the organizations 
who did not specify the year their organization was established in the hope of finding this 
information. I was successful for a few, but many did not indicate this information on 
their websites.  
 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent variable 
This study defines the dependent variable, total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activities as organizational engagement in 10 mitigation and preparedness 
activities. The survey asked, “Has your organization engaged in any of these activities 
over the past year?” Each of the dependent variables has two options, yes and no. The 
mitigation and preparedness activities are: (i) Attended disaster meetings/training courses 
outside your organization. (ii) Mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational 
meeting. (iii) Held disaster-related workshops/trainings within your organization. (iv) 
Discussed in an organizational meeting short-term responses to disasters. (v) Discussed in 
an organizational meeting long-term strategies for recovery from disasters. (vi) Arranged 
 41 
site visits by consultants or experts to better prepare for disasters. (vii) Provided 
information to customers/members of the community on issues related to disasters. (viii)  
Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential losses from 
disasters. (ix) Engaged in non-structural mitigation measures (e.g., securing computers). 
(x) Engaged in structural mitigation measures (e.g., strengthening parts of a building).  
The operational measure of the dependent variable is an index of the 
aforementioned 10 different mitigation and preparedness activities that organizations can 
engage in. I created 10 dummy variables, each coded 1 for those organizations who said 
they engaged in that particular activity over the year and 0 otherwise. I added the 
responses for each respondent to arrive at the total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activity, totactivity for each observation. This ten-item index is very reliable 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .88). Adding mitigation and preparedness activities together is a 
simple and convenient way of creating an index, but it does have its own problems. First, 
the addition implies that each activity is equally weighted. Based on effort, for example, 
it is not reasonable to expect that “Mentioning a potential disaster in an organizational 
meeting” would require the same level of effort as “Engaging in structural mitigation”. 
Second, the addition makes the values of the dependent variable range from 0 to 10. The 
lower and upper bounds create problems for Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
technique. I discuss the implication of these bounds for OLS later in the study.  
This study examines two other proxies for mitigation and preparedness. The first 
is use of disaster information. The survey question states “Do you use disaster-related 
information to help make decisions in your organization?” Respondents could answer 
either a yes or a no. This dependent variable is dichotomous and I coded it as follows: yes 
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= 1 and no = 0. The second proxy for mitigation and preparedness is presence of risk 
manager. The survey question asks respondents; “Does your organization have a risk 
manager?” Respondents could answer either a yes or a no. This dependent variable is also 
dichotomous and coded: yes = 1 and no = 0.  
This study examines briefly another construction of the dependent variable-active 
and passive measures to address disaster risks.  Active measures are those activities that 
involve an organization actually doing something to address disasters not just discussing 
about actions to take (activities i, iii, vi, vii, viii, ix, & x). Passive measures are activities 
that involve an organization simply discussing or mentioning potential actions in an 
organizational meeting (activities ii, iv, & v).  
Independent variables 
This study explains mitigation and preparedness using the following independent 
variables: (i) Concern over disaster impacts, (ii) organizational obstacles, (iii) ownership 
patterns of organizations, and (iv) organizational size.  In addition, this study includes 
three variables as controls for organizational sector: education, health, and 
wholesale/retail trade. Table 3.3 shows the independent variables, their operational 
measures and scales of measurement, and the theoretical justification for their inclusion.  
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Table 3.3. Independent variables, operational measures, coding scheme, and theoretical 
justification 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Operational 
Measure 
Coding Scheme Causal Explanation/ 
Theory 
Concern over disaster 
impact 
An index of 
13 measures 
of disaster 
impact 
Likert scale: 
1=Minor Adverse 
Impact to 
5=Major Adverse 
Impact 
(Nigg, 1986; 
Showalter, 1993) 
Organizational 
obstacles 
An index of 6 
measures of 
organizational 
obstacle 
Likert scale: 1= 
Minor obstacle to 
5=Major obstacle 
(Major, 1998; Wood, 
2004; Bostrom et al., 
2006) 
Single location 
organization 
Obtained 
from 
Memphis 
Regional 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
0= “other” 
organizational 
type, 1=single 
location 
organization, 
(Quarntelli et al., 
1979; Drabek, 1991, 
1994a, 1994b, 1995) 
Organizational size  Obtained 
from 
Memphis 
Regional 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
Continuous: 
Number of 
employees 
(Quarantelli et al., 
1979; Dahlhamer & 
D’Souza, 1997; 
Webb et al., 2000) 
Sector-Education, 
Health, and Wholesale/ 
Retail trade. 
Obtained 
from 
Memphis 
Regional 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
Dichotomous:  
0= “other” sector, 
1= Educational 
sector 
0= “other” sector, 
1= Health sector 
0= “other” sector, 
1= 
Wholesale/Retail 
sector 
 
(Drabek, 1991, 1995 ; 
Dahlhamer & 
D’Souza, 1997) 
 
Concern over Disaster Impacts 
As discussed in chapter two, disasters are capable of inflicting different types of 
impacts, from loss of life to property destruction. Evidence in the disaster literature on 
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household preparedness for earthquakes shows that people concerned over loss of life and 
personal injury are likely to engage in preparedness activities (e.g., Nigg, 1986; 
Showalter, 1993). Although, these examples are at the household level, I expect similar 
relationship between concern over disaster impact and mitigation and preparedness at the 
organizational level. In other words, organizations that are concerned about disaster 
impacts are likely engage in mitigation and preparedness activities. For example, 
organizations concerned over loss of employee life will be more likely to engage in 
mitigation and preparedness activities than organizations that are not. I measure this 
variable by the survey question: “Please indicate the extent to which the following 
disaster impacts might adversely affect your organization” (1=Minor Adverse Impact and 
5=Major Adverse Impact). Respondents could check a box for responses deemed “Not 
Applicable”. The 13 disaster impacts are: (i) damaged reputation, (ii) disruption in 
supplies or deliveries, (iii) inability to communicate with employees, (iv) inadequate 
number of employees, (v) loss of commercial goods, (vi) loss of customers, (vii) loss of 
data, (viii) loss of life, (ix) loss of life support (food, water, etc.), (x) loss relative to 
competitor’s loss, (xi) power outage, (xii) structural damage, (xiii) transportation 
disruption. The scale of the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major adverse impact). For 
simplicity, I consider scales1and 2 to be minor adverse impact, scale 3 to be moderate 
adverse impact, and scales 4 and 5 to be major adverse impact. I create a new 
independent variable, meanimpact, the mean of all the 13 impacts by adding the values 
for all the disaster impacts (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) and dividing by 13. 
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Organizational Obstacles 
I measure this independent variable by the survey question “Please indicate the 
extent to which the following statements are obstacles to disaster planning in your 
organization”. (a) Lack of financial resources to prepare for disasters (b) Lack of support 
from upper-level management within your organization (c) Lack of support from mid-and 
lover-level organizational members (d) Lack of information about the frequency and 
magnitude of disasters (e) Lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of 
disasters (f) Unclear organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation. The 
scale of the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major obstacle). For simplicity, I consider 
scales1and 2 to be minor obstacle, scale 3 to be moderate obstacle, and scales 4 and 5 to 
be major obstacle. I developed an index, meanobstacle the mean of all the obstacles by 
adding the values for all the obstacles together (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) and dividing by 
six. I generated a new variable, meanobstacle
2
 in Stata by squaring meanobstacle. This 
new variable takes care of the non-linear relationship between the dependent variable, 
totactivity and the independent variable, meanobstacle. 
Ownership Pattern of Organizations 
As discussed previously, by ownership pattern I mean whether an organization is 
a single firm or a franchise. Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that franchises do 
more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than single firms (e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; 
Drabek, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). This variable is a dummy, 1=single location firm, 
0=“others”. The “others” category includes headquarters, subsidiaries, and branch. 
Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the information on whether an 
organization is a single firm or franchise. 
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Organizational size 
Previous disaster studies suggest that larger firms do more to mitigate and prepare 
for disasters than do smaller firms (Quarantelli et al., 1979; Drabek, 1991, 1994a, 1994b; 
Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). This study operationalizes this variable by the number of 
employees in an organization. Table 3.4 shows the seven organizational size categories, 
the codes, frequencies, and percent for each category. More than half of the organizations 
in the sample have less than one hundred employees. Memphis Regional Chambers of 
Commerce provided the information on organizational size. 
Table 3.4. Employee size categories 
 
Employee size Code Frequency % 
1-9 1 37 17.21 
10-19 2 22 10.23 
20-49 3 30 13.95 
50-99 4 32 14.88 
100-249 5 47 21.86 
250-499 6 33 15.35 
>=500 7 14 6.51 
Total  215 100 
 
Organizational Sector 
Disaster researchers have found a significant relationship between organizational 
sector and engaging in preparedness activities (Drabek, 1991; Mileti et al., 1993; Drabek, 
1995; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). I introduce three variables as controls for three 
sectors-Education, Health, and Wholesale/Retail trade. Each of these control variables is 
a dummy variable, 1 if a respondent organization belongs to a sector and 0 if otherwise. I 
obtained the information on organizational sector from Memphis Regional Chambers of 
Commerce. 
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Disaster Worry Levels for Different Disasters 
 
This variable is not part of the regression but I discuss it in the descriptive 
analysis. The survey question states, “Using the thermometer scale below, please indicate 
the extent to which you perceive the following disasters are a worry for your 
organization”, on a scale of 100 (a great deal of worry), 50 (moderate worry), and 0 (no 
worry at all). The survey enumerated 15 disasters (Bird flu/pandemics, chemical spills, 
drought, earthquakes, extreme heat, extreme winds/tornadoes, fires, flooding, hurricanes, 
ice storms, severe storms, terrorist attacks, toxic releases, violent crimes, and water 
pollution). In the “other” category, respondents indicated that they were concerned about 
economic problems, racism, food contamination, blackout, vandalism and theft, airplane 
crash, work stoppage (e.g. strikes), intruders, air pollution, and food poisoning.  
 
Hypotheses 
Recall that the main objective of this study is to answer the question “what are the 
determinants of organizational mitigation and preparedness?” To answer this research 
questions, I explore sub-questions i-iv below using alternative hypotheses 1-4 
respectively (the null hypotheses is that there is no relationship between each of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable). In addition, I use descriptive analysis 
to address sub-questions (v-vii).  
i. Does concern over disaster impact lead to more mitigation and preparedness?  
ii. What is the relationship between organizational obstacles and mitigation and 
preparedness?  
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iii. Do single location organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness than 
other types of organizations? 
iv. Does organizational size have a positive effect on mitigation and preparedness?  
v. Which disasters are organizations worried about? 
vi. Which mitigation and preparedness activities do organizations typically engage 
in? 
vii. Do organizations use disaster information in decision-making?  
Hypothesis 1: Organizations that are concerned about disaster impact will be more likely 
than organizations that are not to engage in mitigation and preparedness activities.   
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between organizational obstacles and mitigation 
and preparedness activities.  
Hypothesis 3: Single location firms will be less likely to engage in mitigation and 
preparedness activities than other types of organizations. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between engagement in mitigation and 
preparedness activities and organizational size. 
 
Estimation Methodology 
Tobit Analysis 
In this section, this study uses Tobit analysis to answer the question “What are the 
determinants of organizational mitigation and preparedness?” This study assumes that 
there are some organizations in the sample that are against the adoption of mitigation and 
preparedness activities. This study regards these organizations as having negative values 
for mitigation and preparedness activities. Similarly, this study assumes that there are 
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some organizations in the sample that engaged in more than 10 mitigation and 
preparedness activities over the past year. For instance, some organizations might have 
stored water and food in addition to the 10 activities.  
Unfortunately, I have restricted the sample based on the dependent variable by 
bounding it between 0 (lower limit) and 10 (upper limit). In other words, the dependent 
variable is censored from both left and right. This means that I cannot observe 
organizations that are below 0 or above 10. Tobit is the appropriate technique for 
analyzing censored samples because it will take in to account organizations that engage 
in negative and above 10 mitigation and preparedness activities.  
OLS assumes normality meaning that the cumulative density function (CDF) 
sums to one. However, due to the lower and upper bounds, the CDF does not sum to one. 
Under this scenario, OLS is inappropriate. If I use OLS, the coefficients will be biased 
and inconsistent. Tobit analysis corrects the omitted variable bias and accounts for the 
fact that the expected values of the errors are changing. The Tobit model in this study 
takes the form: 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi*) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2 
(organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle
2) + β4 (single location) + β5 
(organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail 
sector)   + ε 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2 
(organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle
2) + β4 (single location) + β5 
(organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail 
sector)   + ε, if 0 < Yi* ≤ 10 
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Yi = 0, if Yi* ≤ 0 
Where, Yi* is the latent mitigation and preparedness activities adopted and Yi is the 
observed mitigation and preparedness activities adopted.  
Additional Analytical Techniques 
In addition to using Tobit regression, this study uses Logit and OLS. It also 
employs reliability analysis to construct indices for total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activities, obstacles, and concern over disaster impacts. Lastly, it uses the 
Heckman approach to correct for potential selection problems and the RESET and LINK 
tests to test for misspecification of the organizational mitigation and preparedness model. 
 
Sample Selection 
One way to ascertain if there is sample selection in the organizational survey data 
is to compare the distribution of respondents and non-respondents on observable 
characteristics, such as zip code, organizational size, and organization type. If there is 
statistical evidence that the two sub-populations are different on observable 
characteristics, this may be evidence of sample selection. If otherwise, there may not be 
sample selection. In the absence of sample selection, I can use OLS on the sub-population 
of respondents to predict organizational mitigation and preparedness for the entire 
population of organizations in the sample. If otherwise, it will result in biased OLS 
estimates. My a priori expectation is that the two sub-populations are statistically 
different because the research team addressed the surveys to owners and risk managers of 
businesses. Organizations with risk managers may be more likely to answer the survey 
than organizations without risk managers. Risk managers that engaged in mitigation and 
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preparedness in the past year may see the survey as an opportunity to display their 
mitigation and preparedness strategies.  
Heckman Approach 
In this section, I outline the Heckman approach to correct for selection bias in the 
organizational survey data. I start by stating some Heckman assumptions. 
1. The errors are normally distributed.  
2. There is at least one more variable in the survey participation equation (selection 
equation) than the organizational mitigation and preparedness equation (outcome 
equation). 
3. The covariance between the errors of the organizational mitigation and 
preparedness and survey participation equations is not zero. 
Y = Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (dependent variable) 
X = Disaster impact, organizational obstacles, single location, organizational size, 
educational sector, health sector, and wholesale/retail sector (independent variables) 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness Equation (outcome equation): 
Y = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2 (organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle
2
) 
+ β4 (single location) + β5 (organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health 
sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail sector)    + ε,  
if z = 1 
Y = 0, if z = 0 
Survey Participation Equation (Selection Equation):  
Z = {1    if an organization answers survey, (α0+ α1 + μ = 1)} 
Z = {0    if an organization does not answer survey, (α0 + α1 + μ = 0)} 
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α0 + α1 + μ, is a measure of the organizational cost for mitigation and preparedness. This 
measure is observable when an organization decides to answer the survey and 
unobservable otherwise. The two errors, ε & μ will be normally distributed with mean of 
zero, variance of σε
 2
 and σμ
 2
 respectively and ρ = Cov (ε, μ) ≠ 0. There is need to correct 
for the non-zero covariance by including a Heckman correction term in the organizational 
mitigation and preparedness equation. The correction term is:  
ρ [φ (α0 + α1 + μ) / Φ (α0 + α1 + μ)]   (The inverse Mill ratio) 
Where φ and Φ are the values of the probability density and cumulative functions at f 
(attributes) respectively. OLS on this new equation below will yield unbiased 
coefficients.  
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2 
(organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle
2) + β4 (single location) + β5 
(organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail 
sector)    + ρ [φ (α0i + α1i + μi) / Φ (α0i + α1i + μi)] 
The instrumental variable for the Heckman is zip code. This study assumes that 
the zip code in which an organization is located does not affect its ability to engage in 
mitigation and preparedness activities, but it affects the probability that an organization 
will answer the survey. It seems logical to think that organizations located in zip codes 
with bad postal services may not receive the survey (e.g., the survey may be lost) and 
thus will not be able to answer it. This instrument is not perfect because one can argue 
that zip code may be a proxy for proximity to an earthquake fault. In that case, zip code 
may have an effect on mitigation and preparedness.  
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This study groups zip codes by their fourth digits. For instance, 38150, 38152, 
and 38157, all belong to the same cluster (the fourth digit is 8). I removed zip code 
clusters with only one organization (four in total), because one organization in a cluster 
will perfectly predict zip code in that cluster. There were six clusters of zip codes and I 
create five dummy variables for five of them. Below are the null hypothesis and the 
alternate hypothesis for the Heckman.  
H0: There is no selection bias 
H1: There is selection bias 
 
Sample Representativeness 
In this section, I look at how representative the organizational survey data is vis-à-
vis employee size. An understanding of how representative this sample is will give me an 
idea of the extent to which I could generalize the findings of this study. Before, I proceed, 
it is important to say that the intention of the research team is not to make the 
organizational survey sample representative. Rather, the objective is to make the sample 
contain enough large firms. The response rate for the organization survey is 31%. This 
means that 69% of the organizations sampled did not respond to the survey.  
This study examines whether the organizational survey sample is representative of 
the population vis-à-vis employee size. There is no way of knowing if this sample is 
representative on non-observables like the mitigation and preparedness activities that 
non-respondents could have engaged in over the past year. This study conducts a 
difference of means tests to know if the sample mean (μ1) is different than the population 
mean (μ2). Below are the null and alternative hypotheses. 
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H0: μ1 - μ2 = 0 
H1: μ1 - μ2 ≠ 0. 
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CHAPTER IV: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
Chapter IV presents the results of the descriptive and quantitative analyses. This 
chapter begins with a description of individual respondents. Next, it answers three 
questions: (i) Which disasters are organizations worried about? (ii) What mitigation and 
preparedness activities do organizations typically engage in? (iii) Do organizations use 
disaster information in decision-making? Then, it presents the results of the bivariate 
analysis and the Tobit regression, which answers the question “what are the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” This chapter concludes by 
discussing the results of the Heckman approach, the specification tests and the results of 
other additional analyses. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
Table 4.1. Minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for individual  
respondents 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.   
Dev. 
Age of respondent 211 22 84 49.77 10.54 
Number of years of residence 
in Memphis/Shelby County 216 0 76 32.97 18.15 
Number of years on current 
position within organization 217 0 52 11.69 10.78 
Number of years of formal 
education 216 2 25 15.96 3.34 
 
Table 4.1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation values 
for age, years of residence, years in current position within the organization, and years of 
formal education for the respondent individuals. The average age is 50 years. The 
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youngest respondent is 22 years old while the oldest respondent is 84 years old. The 
mean number of years in Memphis is 33 years and the mean number of years in current 
position within the organization is 12 years. Some respondents have been in their current 
positions within their organizations less than a year while one respondent has been in a 
current position for 52 years. The average educational level for the respondents is 16 
years.  
 
 
Disaster Worry Levels among Memphis/Shelby County Organizations 
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Figure 4.1. Mean worry levels for different disasters.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the perceived mean worry level of Memphis/Shelby County 
organizations for 15 different disasters. According to Figure 4.1, the perception is that 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are most worried about earthquakes. The threat 
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posed by the New Madrid Fault may be one of many reasons for this result. The mean 
worry level for earthquakes is 50.6 (out of a possible 100). One possible explanation for 
this result is that Memphis/Shelby organizations are aware of USGS prediction of more 
than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake (magnitude 6-7) hitting the NMSZ within 
the next 50 years (USGS, 1998). Another interpretation is that this result may be an 
indication of response bias. In other words, respondent organizations may have inflated 
their responses regarding disaster worry levels for earthquakes because they may be 
aware that the research team was interested in earthquake issues. After earthquakes, an 
average Memphis/Shelby County organization is worried about extreme winds/tornadoes 
and violent crimes. Conversely, an average Memphis/Shelby County organization is least 
worried about drought, hurricanes, and water pollution.  
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Figure 4.2. Median worry levels for different disasters.  
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Figure 4.2 shows the perceived median worry level for all 15 disasters. Half of 
respondents are above the median worry level for earthquakes, extreme winds/tornadoes, 
and violent crimes. All the respondents reported a median worry level of zero for 
hurricanes and droughts.  
Table 4.2. Disaster types and worry levels among Memphis/Shelby County organizations. 
 
Disaster Type 
No  
worry at 
all (%) 
Moderate 
worry 
(%) 
A great deal 
of worry 
(%) Mean 
95%  
Conf.  
Interval 
Earthquakes 12 20 15 50.6 46.0 55.2 
Extreme 
winds/tornadoes 11 20 9 48.5 44.2 52.7 
Violent Crimes 13 15 13 47.2 42.6 51.7 
Fires 19 17 8 41.3 36.8 45.8 
Severe storms 15 21 6 40.1 36.1 44.1 
Ice Storms 14 17 4 37.8 33.7 41.8 
Bird 
Flu/Pandemics 33 14 6 29.8 25.4 34.2 
Terrorist attacks 30 12 5 26.3 22.4 30.2 
Extreme heat 33 11 2 25.4 21.5 29.3 
Chemical spills 40 10 4 24.7 20.6 28.8 
Toxic releases 38 7 4 23.8 19.8 27.8 
Flooding 38 11 1 21.5 18.0 25.0 
Water pollution 43 8 4 18.1 14.6 21.6 
Hurricanes 64 3 3 12.9 9.5 16.3 
Drought 59 4 0 8.9 6.7 11.2 
 
Note: N=224 
 
Table 4.2, which takes a closer look at the variance of worry levels for the 15 
disasters  reveals that 15% and 13% of respondents reported that earthquakes and violent 
crimes are a great deal of worry to their organizations respectively. About 21% of 
respondents say that severe storms pose moderate worry to their organizations. 
Furthermore, 64% of respondent organizations say their organizations are not worried at 
all about hurricanes while 59% say they are not worried at all about droughts. 
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Figure 4.3. Mitigation and preparedness activities taken by organizations in 
Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee. 
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Mitigation and preparedness Activities in Organizations 
Figure 4.3 shows the 10 disaster mitigation and preparedness activities ranked in a 
descending according to the proportion of responding organizations that engaged in each 
activity.  The activities engaged in most by Memphis/Shelby County organizations over 
the past year are “mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting” (69%) 
followed by “discussed in an organizational meeting short-term responses to disasters” 
(64%).  These two activities involve low effort.  This result is consistent with that of 
Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) who found that almost 4 in every 10 respondents 
attended meetings/received written information.  
About 57% of these organizations engaged in non-structural mitigation (e.g., 
securing computers) over the past year. The same number assessed or evaluated 
vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential losses from disasters over the past year. 
These two activities seem to require high level of effort. The least mentioned activity is 
“engaged in structural mitigation measures”, which is probably the most effort-
demanding measure, with about 25% reported engagement in this activity over the past 
year.  
 
Organizations and Use of Disaster Information 
Out of the 733 organizations surveyed, 216 of them responded to the question 
regarding the use of disaster information. About 61% of respondents said they use 
disaster-related information in making decisions. This number seems high and may be an 
indication of selection bias.  
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Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables with recoded 
values 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activities (DV) 225 4.34 3.40 0 10 
Mean disaster impact 225 3.29 1.27 0 5 
Mean obstacles 225 1.88 1.33 0 5 
Mean obstacle squared 225 5.29 5.28 0 25 
Single location organization 218 0.78 - 0 1 
Employee size 215 3.86 1.87 1 7 
Educational sector 225 0.08 - 0 1 
Health sector 225 0.16 - 0 1 
Wholesale/Retail sector 225 0.15 - 0 1 
 
Note: I replaced non-responses with zeroes for total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activities. In addition, I replaced non-responses and “not applicable” 
responses with zeroes for mean disaster impact and mean obstacles.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for dependent and independent 
variables. On average, Memphis/Shelby County organization engaged in 4.3 of the 10 
possible mitigation and preparedness activities (43%). On the one hand, my result may be 
an indication that Memphis/Shelby County organizations are actually doing more to 
mitigate and prepare for disasters than previous studies suggest (e.g., Dahlhamer & 
D’Souza, 1997). On the other hand, this result may have been inflated due to sample bias. 
In other words, the organizational survey data may show a preponderance of 
organizations that engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities over those that did 
not.  
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Table 4.4. Variance of different types of disaster impact 
 
Types of Disaster Impact 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Obs 
Damaged reputation 7 14 10 13 20 37 213 
Disruption in supplies and 
deliveries 4 5 8 21 19 43 217 
Inability to communicate with 
employees 2 5 4 18 37 34 218 
Inadequate number of 
employees 2 10 7 23 29 29 217 
Loss of commercial goods 12 14 18 23 16 17 217 
Loss of customers 5 10 5 12 17 51 219 
Loss of data 0 5 7 19 33 36 218 
Loss of life 1 2 5 9 16 66 217 
Loss of life support (food, 
water, etc.) 3 5 7 10 25 50 215 
Loss relative to competitor's 
loss 16 17 13 28 16 10 216 
Power outage 0 3 7 21 28 41 219 
Structural damage 0 2 3 21 32 42 217 
Transportation disruption 0 7 9 24 29 31 217 
 
Note: All the values are percentages. The column for zero represents  
the percentage of respondents that said the impact was not applicable to  
their organizations or those that did not answer the question.  
 
Table 4.4 takes a closer look at disaster impact. Recall in the previous chapter that 
scales1and 2 represent minor adverse impact, scale 3 represents moderate adverse impact 
and scales 4 and 5 represent major adverse impact. This table indicates that 7% of 
organizations reported that damaged reputation is not applicable to their organization or 
simply did not answer this question. However, among respondents, 24% (categories 1 & 
2) and 13% of respondent organizations said that damaged reputation has minor and 
moderate adverse impacts on their organizations respectively. Furthermore, 57% 
(categories 4 & 5) reported that damaged reputation has a major adverse impact on their 
organizations. The disaster impact with the highest percentage on major adverse impact is 
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loss of life (82%) followed by loss of life support (75%), while that with the lowest 
percentage is loss relative to competitor’s loss (26%) followed by loss of commercial 
goods (33%). 
Respondents view organizational obstacles as minor impediments to disaster 
planning (1.88). Single-location organizations represent 78% of all respondent 
organizations. This number is comparable to the proportion of single-location 
organizations in the sampling frame (71%). However, this number is different from the 
31% found by Dahlhamer & D’Souza (1997). About 8% of respondent organizations 
belong to the educational sector. Twice this number belongs to the health sector and 15% 
of respondent organizations constitute the wholesale/retail sector. In contrast to 
Dahlhamer & D’Souza’s (1997) study, 27% of organizations belonged to the 
wholesale/retail sector.  
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Table 4.5. Variance of organizational obstacles 
 
Independent Variables 
(Obstacles) 
  
0 
1 
(Minor) 2 3 4 
5 
(Major) Total 
%  % % % % % % 
Lack of financial resources 
to prepare for disasters 9 17 17 24 11 21 99 
Lack of convincing 
information about the 
potential impacts of 
disasters 13 24 12 23 18 10 100 
Lack of information about 
the frequency and 
magnitude disasters 13 23 16 24 13 10 99 
Unclear organizational 
benefits from disaster 
planning and mitigation 14 28 16 20 13 10 101 
Lack of support from mid- 
and lower-level 
organizational members 20 35 20 18 4 3 100 
Lack of support from 
upper-level management 
within your organization 19 42 16 12 4 7 100 
 
Note: The total percentages for some of the obstacle do not sum to 100 because of 
rounding. The zero column represents the percentage of respondents that said the obstacle 
was not applicable to their organizations or those organizations that did not answer the 
question. N=225 
 
In this section, I take a closer look at the descriptive statistics for organizational 
obstacle. Table 4.5 shows the variance and means for the six organizational obstacles. 
Recall in the previous chapter that scales1and 2 represent minor obstacle, scale 3 
represents moderate obstacle, and scales 4 and 5 represent major obstacles. This table 
indicates that 9% of organizations reported that lack of financial resources to prepare for 
disasters is not applicable to their organization or simply did not answer this question. 
However, among respondents, 34% (categories 1 & 2) and 24% of respondent 
organizations said that lack of financial resources to prepare for disasters is a minor and 
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moderate obstacle to disaster planning within their organizations respectively. 
Furthermore, 32% (categories 4 & 5) reported that it is a major obstacle to disaster 
planning within their organizations. About 55% of organizations said lack of support 
from mid- and lower-level organizational members and about 58% said lack of support 
from upper-level management within the organization are minor obstacles to disaster 
planning.  
In general, one in every three respondents perceives lack of financial resources to 
prepare for disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their organization. 
While one in four respondents perceives lack of convincing information about the 
potential impacts of disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their 
organization. At least, one in every three respondents says all six obstacles pose a minor 
problem to disaster planning in their organizations.  
 
Correlation between the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate regression, I discuss the results of 
the correlations between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The goal 
is to understand the association between the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables.  
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Table 4.6. Pairwise correlations between dependent and independent variables 
 
  Totactivity Observation 
Meanimpact 0.218*** 225 
Meanobstacle 0.084 225 
Meanobstacle
2
 -0.015 225 
Single -0.270*** 218 
Empsize 0.485*** 215 
Education 0.188*** 225 
Health 0.120* 225 
Wholesale/retail -0.273*** 225 
 
***significance at 0.01 level 
**significance at 0.05 level 
*significance at 0.1 level 
 
Table 4.6 shows that there is a positive association between mitigation and 
preparedness and disaster impact, organizational obstacles, employee size, organizations 
in the educational sector, and organizations in the health sector. Conversely, there is a 
negative association between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacle
2
, 
single location organizations as well as organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. All 
the correlation coefficients are significant except for the correlation coefficient on 
organizational obstacle and organizational obstacle
2
.  
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Results of the Tobit Analyses 
 
Table 4.7. Summary of results  
Total number of 
mitigation & 
preparedness 
activities (DV) 
Tobit with 
recoded  
Values (Base 
model) 
(n=215) 
Pseudo R
2
= 
0.107 
Tobit with 
missing  
values  
(n=146) 
 
Pseudo R
2
 = 
0.115 
OLS with 
recoded 
 values 
(n=215) 
 
R
2
 = 0.413 
OLS with 
missing  
values  
(n=146)  
 
R
2
 = 0.433 
 
Mean disaster 
impact 
 
0.53 (0.20)*** 
 
0.17 (0.37) 
 
0.35 (0.15)** 
 
0.17 (0.30) 
Mean obstacle 
1.03 (0.54)* -1.35 (1.45) 0.76 (0.41)* -0.90 (1.19) 
Mean obstacle
2
  
 
-0.33 (0.14)** 
 
0.12 (0.27) 
 
-0.25 (0.10)** 
 
0.06 (0.22) 
Single location 
organization 
 
-2.71 (0.61)*** 
 
-2.89 (0.63)*** 
 
-2.13 (0.47)*** 
 
-2.38 
(0.53)*** 
Employee size 
 
0.84 (0.13)*** 
 
0.85 (0.15)*** 
 
0.66 (0.10)*** 
 
0.69 
(0.12)*** 
Educational 
sector 
 
3.02 (0.89)*** 
 
2.59 (0.85)*** 
 
2.49 (0.69)*** 
 
2.26 
(0.71)*** 
Health sector 
 
1.71 (0.67)** 
 
0.92 (0.77) 
 
1.22 (0.52)** 
 
0.73 (0.64) 
Wholesale/ 
Retail sector 
 
-2.20 (0.70)*** 
 
-3.50 (0.79)*** 
 
-1.54 (0.51)*** 
 
-2.50 
(0.62)*** 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
***significance at 0.01 level 
**significance at 0.05 level 
*significance at 0.1 level 
 
This section presents the results of the base Tobit model with recoded values 
(sample size = 215). Table 4.7 indicates that this model and all the independent variables 
are statistically significant. I cannot interpret the Tobit coefficients as effect sizes. 
Therefore, I focus on the signs and significance of the coefficients in the following 
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paragraphs. Later, I interpret the marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. The Tobit result suggests that there is a positive significant 
association between mitigation and preparedness and concern over disaster impacts, 
organizational obstacle, employee size, and organizations in the educational and health 
sectors.  
Employee size is the most significant predictor of mitigation and preparedness in 
this study. The larger the organization the more likely it is to have engaged in mitigation 
and preparedness activities in the past year. This finding is in accordance with that of 
previous studies. For instance, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that larger companies were 
more likely to engage in more planning than smaller companies did. Similarly, in a study 
of disaster evacuation planning in the tourist industry, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b) 
found that firms with more employees had more extensive disaster evacuation plans than 
firms with less employees did. One reason for the positive relationship between 
organizational size and mitigation and preparedness is that larger organizations have the 
necessary resources, such as staff and time, to adopt or institute mitigation and 
preparedness measures (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).  
Memphis/Shelby County organizations that were concerned about disaster 
impacts engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities over the past year. Similarly, 
one could argue that the more disaster mitigation and preparedness activities an 
organization engages in, the lower the concern about disaster impact.  In other words, 
there is may be simultaneity between mitigation and preparedness and concern about 
disaster impact. However, the positive association between mitigation and preparedness 
activities and concern about disaster impact in the data casts doubt on such a negative 
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relationship. Furthermore, past disaster studies at the household level have found similar 
positive relationships. For instance, in her study of the effect of the Iben Browning 
earthquake prediction, Showalter (1993) found a positive relationship between concern 
over loss of life and personal injury and respondents’ willingness to engage in 
preparedness activities. Furthermore, organizations in the educational and health sectors 
are more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness than organizations in other 
sectors. 
The coefficients on meanobstacle and meanobstacle
2
 show that there is a positive 
association between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles until 
meanobstacle peaks at 1.56 and then the association becomes negative. The perception of 
respondents is that increases in the level of organizational obstacle lead to increases in the 
number of mitigation and preparedness activities adopted until organizational obstacle 
peaks at 1.56 where further increases in organizational obstacle lead to decreases in the 
number of mitigation and preparedness activities engaged in over the past year.  
Mitigation and preparedness = 1.03 meanobstacle – (0.33) meanobstacle2 
Δ mitigation and preparedness/ Δ meanobstacle = 1.03 – 2(0.33) meanobstacle 
Δ mitigation and preparedness/ Δ meanobstacle = 1.03 – 0.66 meanobstacle 
1.03 – 0.66 Meanobstacle = 0 
Meanobstacle = 1.03/0.66 = 1.56 
 
The result also indicates that mitigation and preparedness activities are negatively 
associated with single location organizations. This result is in line with that of previous 
research. For instance, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995) found that firms that were part 
of a larger chain engaged in more disaster evacuation planning than single firms did.  
Similarly, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that national chemical companies engaged in 
more preparedness than single local chemical firms did. This finding may be due to the 
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mandates given to local chapters by corporate headquarters to engage in disaster 
preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).  
Furthermore, this study finds a negative significant relationship between 
mitigation and preparedness and organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. Dahlhamer 
& D’Souza (1997) also found a negative but insignificant relationship between 
organizations in the wholesale/retail sector and disaster preparedness. In sum, the signs 
from the bivariate analysis are similar to those of the multivariate analysis.  
The marginal effects are the same as the Tobit coefficients. The independent 
variable with the biggest marginal effect is education followed by single, then 
wholesale/retail. The independent variable with the smallest marginal effect is disaster 
impact followed by employee size. 
A unit increase in the level of disaster impact leads to 0.53 unit increase in 
expected mitigation and preparedness holding other variables at their means. Each 
additional increase in the level of organizational obstacle from minor obstacle to major 
obstacle increases expected mitigation and preparedness by 1.03 units until 
organizational obstacle peaks at 1.56, after which additional increases in organizational 
obstacle lead to a decrease in expected mitigation and preparedness, holding other 
variables at their means. Holding all other variables at their means, single location 
organizations decrease expected mitigation and preparedness by about 2.71 units.  A unit 
increase in employee size leads to 0.84 unit increase in expected mitigation and 
preparedness holding other variables at their means. While organizations in the 
wholesale/retail trade decrease expected mitigation and preparedness by about 2.20 units, 
organizations in the educational sector and health sector increase expected mitigation and 
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preparedness by about 3.02 and 1.71 units respectively, holding other variables at their 
means.  
 
Comparing the Tobit Results from the Initial and Final Samples 
In this section, I compare the outputs from two Tobit models (see Table 4.7). The 
first output is from the base Tobit model and the second is from the initial sample with 
missing values (sample size = 146). The reason for comparing these two outputs is to 
ascertain if the recoding has any effect on the relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  
The independent variables from both outputs have the same signs except for 
organizational obstacle
 
and organizational obstacle2. Organizational obstacle
 
is positive 
in the base model and negative in the second Tobit while the reverse is the case for 
organizational obstacle
2
. Although, both models are significant, they are different in some 
respects. First, the variables disaster impact, organizational obstacle,
 
organizational 
obstacle
2
, and health sector are significant in the base model and not in the second Tobit.  
After the recoding, there appears to be an increase in the standard errors of the second 
Tobit coefficients (except the standard error on educational sector). The smaller sample 
size (n=146) and more restricted variation in the independent variables (I replaced the 
actual values, which may range from 1-5, with zeroes) are two possible reasons for the 
increased standard errors in the second Tobit output.  
In sum, the recoding resulted in sign changes and made four independent 
variables become significant. It is difficult to say which of the two Tobit models is better. 
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However, it is clear that based on the value of the Pseudo R
2
 the Tobit model with 
missing values has a slightly better fit.  
 
Comparing the Tobit Output with the OLS Regression Output 
In this section, I compare the output of the base model and that of the OLS 
regression (Table 4.7) based on the sample with recoded values (sample size = 215). The 
reason for this comparison is to know if OLS could have yielded similar result.  The 
results from both analyses are quite similar. In general, both models are significant and 
all the independent variables from both models have the same signs. Furthermore, all the 
independent variables in both models are significant. However, the coefficients from the 
base model are larger than the respective ones from the OLS regression.  
I also compare the second Tobit model and the OLS regression outputs based on 
the original data with missing values (N=146). These two models are significant and the 
same dependent variables in both models are significant. Similarly, the same dependent 
variables are insignificant. All the Tobit coefficients are larger than their OLS 
counterparts except for the coefficients on disaster impact.  
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Result of the Heckman Approach 
Table 4.8. Heckman output 
Number of obs     = 645 
Censored obs        = 448 
Uncensored obs    = 197 
Wald chi2(7)         = 125.02 
Log likelihood      = -854.6438                                             
Prob > chi2           = 0.0000 
Total number of mitigation 
and preparedness activities 
(DV) 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
 
Std. error 
 
Mean disaster impact 
 
0.43 *** 
 
0.15 
Mean obstacle 
-0.18 
 
0.14 
Single location organization -1.49* 0.88 
Employee size .82*** 0.13 
Educational sector 
 
2.43*** 
 
0.74 
Health sector 
 
1.50*** 
 
0.55 
Wholesale/Retail sector -1.58*** 0.57 
Select   
Zip1 0.22 0.81 
Zip2 0.24 0.82 
Zip3 0.17 0.83 
Zipp4 0.44 0.80 
Zip5 0.49 0.85 
Empsize 0.05* 0.03 
Single 0.42*** 0.12 
_cons -1.27 0.83 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     0.27              Prob > 
chi2 = 0.6030 
 
***significance at 0.01 level 
**significance at 0.05 level 
*significance at 0.1 level 
 
Based on the results of the descriptive statistics my initial expectation was that 
organizations that engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities are more likely to 
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answer the survey than organizations that did not engage in mitigation and preparedness 
activities. To correct this potential problem, this study uses the Heckman approach.  
Table 4.8 shows that the result of the Heckman is generally consistent with that of 
the base Tobit model discussed earlier. Both models are significant and all the 
independent variables from both models have the same signs. In addition, all the 
independent variables in both models are significant except for organizational obstacle, 
which is significant in the base model and insignificant in the Heckman model.   
The effect of more employees increases the probability of selection (answering a 
survey) and the predicted engagement in mitigation and preparedness activities 
conditional on participating in the survey. The effect of being a single location 
organization increases the probability of selection (answering a survey) and decreases the 
predicted engagement in mitigation and preparedness activities conditional on answering 
in the survey. 
The null hypothesis for the Heckman model is that there is no selection bias in the 
sample. The likelihood-ratio test of independent equations (rho = 0) is not significant, 
meaning that I fail to reject the null hypothesis. In sum, while the descriptive statistics 
may have suggested sample bias, the Heckman result did not indicate that this problem 
exists in the organizational survey data.  
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Result of the Sample Representative Test 
The result of the difference of means tests reveals that there is no statistical 
difference between the population mean and the sample mean. The implication is that the 
organizational survey sample is representative of the population based on employee size 
alone. However, I cannot say anything about the representativeness of the organizational 
survey sample based on unobservable characteristics like the mitigation and preparedness 
activities adopted.  
 
Result of the Specification Test: Non-linearity 
 
I performed a RESET Test on the data with the aim of investigating whether the 
relationship between the dependent variable and any of the independent variables is non-
linear. I started by creating the squared term for all the independent variables and then 
tested if these squared terms belong to the model or not (Stata dropped all dummy 
variables because of perfect collinearity). The null hypothesis is that none of the squared 
terms of all the independent variables belongs in the model. The result of the F-test 
revealed that meanobstacles
2
 belongs in the model. Consequently, I adjusted my model 
by including meanobstacles
2
. 
 
Result of the Specification Test: Omitted Variable 
This study performs a LINK test to the mitigation and preparedness model to 
ascertain if Tobit is the appropriate function to use and if the model has omitted 
important determinant(s). If my model is specified properly, there should not be any 
additional determinant(s) that would be significant in my model except by chance. What 
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the LINK test does is to rebuild my model using the linear predicted values (_hat) and the 
linear predicted value squared (_hatsq). The result of the linktest indicates that the linear 
predicted value is a statistically significant predictor and the linear predicted value 
squared is not a statistically significant predictor. Since the linear predicted value squared 
is not significant, the LINK test is not significant. Although, the result indicates that my 
model uses the appropriate function and there are no omitted variables, still there may be 
problems with the model that the LINK test failed to detect.  
 
Results of the Additional Analyses 
 
I employed two additional variables - use of disaster information and availability 
of a risk manager - in the organizational survey data as proxies for the dependent 
variable. The correlation between the initial dependent variable, total number of 
mitigation and preparedness activity and use of disaster information and availability of 
risk manager are 0.63 and 0.57 respectively. Organizations that used disaster information 
are coded 1 and those that did not are coded 0. Similarly, organizations that have a risk 
manager are coded 1 while those that do not have a risk manager are coded 0. I ran two 
Logit regressions, one for each of the two proxies, on the same dependent variables as in 
the previous analyses. Logit is the appropriate model because of the dichotomous nature 
of these proxies. 
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Table 4.9. Comparing the results from three different models 
 
 Base model 
(n=215) 
Total number 
of mitigation & 
preparedness 
activities (DV) 
Logit (n=189) 
Use of disaster 
information 
(DV)
a
 
Logit (n=198) 
Presence of 
risk manager 
(DV) 
 
Mean disaster impact 
 
0.53 (0.20)*** 
 
0.29 (0.15)* 
 
 
0.08 (0.15) 
0.10 
Mean obstacles 
1.03 (0.54)* 0.35 (0.39) 0.51 (0.38) 
0.57 
Mean obstacle squared 
 
-0.33 (0.14)** 
 
-0.06 (0.09) 
 
-0.14 (0.10) 
-0.55 
Single location 
organization 
 
-2.71 (0.61)*** 
 
-1.94 (0.53)*** 
 
-1.78 
(0.43)*** 
-0.42 
Employee size 
 
0.84 (0.13)*** 
 
0.30 (0.10)*** 
 
0.27 
(0.09)*** 
0.38 
 
Educational sector 
 
3.02 (0.89)*** 
 
----
b
 
 
2.27 
(0.70)*** 
0.48 
hHealth sector 
 
1.71 (0.67)** 
 
1.33 (0.52)*** 
 
0.49 (0.45) 
0.12 
Wholesale/Retail 
sector 
 
-2.20 (0.70)*** 
 
-.2.74 
(0.68)*** 
 
-1.10 (0.56)* 
-0.24 
 
a 
Stata could not produce the predicted probabilities for use of disaster information. 
b
 Stata dropped educational sector for predicting success perfectly. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors and predicted probabilities in bold print. 
The Tobit coefficients are the same as the marginal values.  
***significance at 0.01 level 
**significance at 0.05 level 
*significance at 0.10 level 
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Table 4.9 compares the results from these two Logit models with that of the base 
model and shows the predicted probabilities for the risk manager model. The result of the 
first Logit analysis with use of disaster information as the dependent variable indicates 
that the model is significant. All the significant variables in the base model are also 
significant in the first Logit analysis, except organizational obstacle and organizational 
obstacle
2
. Stata dropped educational sector for predicting success perfectly. In addition, 
all the independent variables have the same signs in both models. In general, the sizes of 
the coefficients are smaller in the Logit output except the coefficient on wholesale/retail 
sector.  
The result of the second Logit analysis with risk manager as the dependent 
variable shows that the model is significant. In the base model, all the independent 
variables are significant. However, in the second Logit output four independent variables-
disaster impact, organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle2, and health sector-are 
insignificant. Furthermore, all the independent variables have the same signs in both 
models and the Logit coefficients are smaller than their counterparts are in the base 
model. 
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Table 4.10. Comparing the outputs from the active, passive, and base models 
Total number of mitigation 
& preparedness activities 
(DV) 
Tobit with 
recoded  
Values (Base 
model) 
(n=215) 
 
 
Active 
measures  
(n=199) 
 
Passive 
measures 
(n=205) 
 
Mean disaster impact 
 
0.53 (0.20)*** 
 
0.24 (0.16) 
 
-0.00 (0.08) 
Mean obstacle 
1.03 (0.54)* 0.10 (0.39) 0.32 (0.21) 
Mean obstacle
2
  
 
-0.33 (0.14)** 
 
-0.10 (0.10) 
 
-0.10 (0.05)* 
Single location organization 
 
-2.71 (0.61)*** 
 
-1.68 (0.42)*** 
 
-1.12 (0.23)*** 
Employee size 
 
0.84 (0.13)*** 
 
0.61 (0.10)*** 
 
0.31 (0.05)*** 
Educational sector 
 
3.02 (0.89)*** 
 
1.92 (0.63)*** 
 
0.94 (0.34)*** 
Health sector 
 
1.71 (0.67)** 
 
0.20 (0.47) 
 
0.77 (0.26)*** 
Wholesale/ 
Retail sector 
 
-2.20 (0.70)*** 
 
-2.24 (0.50) 
 
-0.85 (0.28)** 
 
***significance at 0.01 level 
**significance at 0.05 level 
*significance at 0.10 level 
 
Table 4.10 presents the outputs from active, passive, and the base models. In the 
base model, all the independent variables are significant. However, when the 10 
mitigation and preparedness activities were grouped into active and passive measures and 
two Tobit regressions were run, the results are different. The following variables are 
insignificant in the active measure model-concern over disaster impact, organizational 
obstacles, organizations in the health sector and organizations in the wholesale/retail 
sector. In other words, these four independent variables are not significant determinants 
of active measures to address disaster risks in organizations. In the passive measure 
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model, concern over disaster impact and organizational obstacles are not significant 
determinants of passive measures to address disaster risks in organizations.  
In addition to the above analyses, I examine each of the mitigation and 
preparedness activities individually using the same independent variables as in the 
previous analyses. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between 
each of the mitigation and preparedness activity and each of the independent variables. 
Table 4.11 shows changes in the predicted probabilities from 10 Logit models for all the 
mitigation and preparedness activities. I arranged the mitigation and preparedness 
activities from top to bottom in a decreasing order of significance and the dependent 
variables from left to right in a decreasing order of significance. Table 4.11 indicates that 
the most significant dependent variable is employee size followed by single location. In 
fact, employee size is significant and positive in all the 10 activities. Single location is 
significant in all but one activity and has a negative sign in all the activities. At the 
bottom of the table are organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle
2
, and disaster 
impact, which are insignificant in all but one activity each. A unit increase in employee 
size leads to a 69 percentage point increase in the probability of holding 
workshops/training courses, holding all other variables constant at their means. 
In sum, these results differ from that of the base model. Recall that in the base 
model, all the independent variables are significant. In this Logit models, only four of the 
eight independent variables (employee size, single location, wholesale/retail, and 
education) are significant in at least 5 of the 10 mitigation and preparedness activities.  
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Table 4.11. Changes in Predicted Probabilities for disaster mitigation and  
preparedness activities from Logit models 
 
  
Emp 
size Single  
Whole. 
/Retail Educ. Health 
Mean 
impact 
Mean 
obst.
2
 
Mean  
obst. 
Held 
workshops 
0.69 
*** 
-0.29 
*** 
-0.41 
*** 
0.30 
** 0.11 -0.05 
-0.69 
** 
0.72 
* 
 
Long-term 
Recovery 
0.64 
*** 
-0.43 
*** 
-0.40 
*** 
0.29 
** 0.13 -0.03 -0.57 0.55 
 
Mentioned 
Disaster 
0.41 
*** 
-0.24 
*** 
-0.23 
** 
0.19 
* 
0.21 
** 0.02 -0.55 0.33 
 
Vuln. 
Ass’t 
0.39 
*** 
-0.24 
** 
-0.36 
*** 
0.35 
** 0.01 0.19 -0.57` 0.28 
 
Attended 
Meeting 
0.63 
*** 
-0.25 
** 
-0.37 
*** 
0.27 
* 
0.20 
* 0.13 -0.37 0.31 
 
Short-term 
Response 
0.56 
*** 
-0.31 
*** -0.13 
0.20 
* 
0.22 
** 0.03 -0.7 0.43 
 
 
Site Visit 
0.40 
*** 
-0.30 
*** 
-0.18 
** 
0.22 
* -0.06 0.05 -0.33 0.2 
 
Provided 
Info. 
0.22 
** 
-0.22 
** 
-0.24 
** 
0.53 
*** -0.09 0.18 0.57 -0.36 
 
Non-
Structural 
Mitigation 
0.41 
*** 
-0.19 
** -0.09 0.1 0.15 
0.33 
** -0.28 0.17 
 
Structural 
Mitigation 
0.25 
*** -0.09 
-0.20 
** 0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.13 -0.07 
 
Note: The numbers indicate changes in predicted probability of the dependent variable as 
the independent variables change from their minimum to their maximum holding other 
independent variables at their means.  
***significance at 0.01 level 
**significance at 0.05 level 
*significance at 0.10 level 
 
 
 
 
 82 
Finally, I replaced mean disaster obstacle with each of the 13 disaster impacts and 
ran 13 different Tobit regressions on the same independent variables as in the base 
model. Only four of the 13 disaster impacts are significant with the expected positive 
signs-inability to communicate with employees, inadequate number of employees, loss of 
life, and transportation disruption. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of this study. It 
begins by reiterating the research questions and summarizing the results. Next, it 
discusses the findings in the context of previous research and examines the policy 
implications of the results. The chapter ends by discussing some limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
The main goal of this study is to answer the question “what are the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” The following four sub-
questions provide good basis for exploring this question. (i) Does concern over disaster 
impact lead to more mitigation and preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship between 
mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles? (iii) Do single location 
organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness than other types of 
organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a positive effect on mitigation and 
preparedness? In order to answer the question regarding the determinants of mitigation 
and preparedness in organizations, this study utilizes four independent variables - concern 
over disaster impacts, organizational obstacles, ownership patterns of organizations, and 
organizational size.  In addition, this study includes three variables as controls for 
organizational sector: education, health, and wholesale/retail trade. In addition to this 
main research question, I explore three other questions. (i) Which disasters are 
organizations worried about? (ii) Which mitigation and preparedness activities do 
organizations typically engage in? (iii) Do organizations use disaster information in 
decision-making?  
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Disaster Worry Levels among Memphis/Shelby County Organizations 
 
The perception according to respondents is that earthquakes pose the greatest 
threat to Memphis/Shelby County organizations. This suggests that Memphis/Shelby 
County organizations may be aware of the danger that can result from the New Madrid 
Fault Zone. Another interpretation is that this result may be an indication of response 
bias; respondents may have inflated their responses regarding disaster worry levels for 
earthquakes because they may be aware that the research team was interested in 
earthquake issues. Conversely, more than half of responds reported that they are not 
worried at all about hurricanes and drought. In addition, severe storms pose moderate 
worry to Memphis/Shelby County organizations.  
Half of respondents are above the median worry level for earthquakes, extreme 
winds/tornadoes, and violent crimes. All the respondents reported a median worry level 
of zero for hurricanes and droughts.  
 
Mitigation and Preparedness Activities in Organizations 
The activities engaged in most by Memphis/Shelby County organizations during 
the past year involve meetings. In particular, these organizations are most likely to 
mention a potential disaster or discuss short-term responses to disasters in an 
organizational meeting over the past year.  These activities involve low effort. This result 
is consistent with that of Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) who found that attending 
meetings/receiving written information is common among Memphis organizations.  
Approximately 6 out of every 10 organizations engaged in non-structural 
mitigation (e.g., securing computers) over the past year. The same number assessed or 
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evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential losses from disasters during the 
past year.  These two activities require higher level of effort when compared to holding 
meetings. The least activity Memphis/Shelby County organizations engaged in during the 
past year is structural mitigation, which is probably the most effort-demanding measure. 
An average organization in Memphis/Shelby County engaged in about half of the 
mitigation and preparedness activities over the past year. This result refutes the claim by 
prior research on the low level of preparedness in Memphis (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 
1997). It is noteworthy that this result may have been inflated as a result of sample bias. 
 
Organizations and Use of Disaster Information 
Six out of every 10 Memphis/Shelby County organizations use disaster-related 
information to make decisions within their organizations. This result suggests that 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are receptive to disaster-related information that 
can aid them in their disaster plans.  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
On average, Memphis/Shelby County organization engaged in 4.3 of the 10 
possible mitigation and preparedness activities. This result may be an indication that 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are actually doing more to mitigate and prepare 
for disasters than previous studies suggest (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).  
Respondents reported that disaster impacts have a moderate adverse impact on 
their organizations (3.29). The disaster impact with the highest percentage on major 
adverse impact is loss of life (82%) followed by loss of life support (75%), while that 
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with the lowest percentage is loss relative to competitor’s loss (26%) followed by loss of 
commercial goods (33%). In addition, respondents view organizational obstacles as 
minor impediments to disaster planning (1.88). Single-location organizations represent 
78% of all respondent organizations. This number is comparable to the proportion of 
single-location organizations in the sampling frame (71%). About 8% of respondent 
organizations belong to the educational sector. Twice this number belongs to the health 
sector and 15% of respondent organizations constitute the wholesale/retail sector. In 
contrast to Dahlhamer & D’Souza’s (1997) study, 27% of organizations belonged to the 
wholesale/retail sector.  
In general, 1 in every 3 respondents perceives lack of financial resources to 
prepare for disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their organization. 
While one in four respondents perceives lack of convincing information about the 
potential impacts of disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their 
organization. At least, 1 in every 3 respondents says all 6 obstacles pose a minor problem 
to disaster planning in their organizations.  
 
The Result of the Correlation Analysis 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate regression, I briefly examine the 
result of the correlation analysis between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. This study finds that there is a positive association between mitigation and 
preparedness and disaster impact, organizational obstacles, employee size, organizations 
in the educational sector, and organizations in the health sector. In addition, there is a 
negative association between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacle
2
, 
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single location, as well as organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. All the correlation 
coefficients are significant except for the correlation coefficient on organizational 
obstacle and organizational obstacle
2
.  
 
The Determinants of Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness 
The multivariate Tobit analysis result reveals that there is a significant positive 
relationship between mitigation and preparedness and organizational size. In other words, 
the smaller the organization the fewer the number of mitigation and preparedness 
activities adopted. This finding is in accordance with that of previous research (e.g., 
Quarantelli et al., 1979; Drabek, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). 
Some disaster studies have explained the positive association between mitigation and 
preparedness and organizational size in terms of unavailability of resources. In fact, this 
resource argument is common in the literature on disasters at the household (Mileti 
1999), community (May & Birkland 1994; Wood, 2004), and organizational level (Mileti 
et al., 1993; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Tierney, 2006). That is smaller organizations 
do not have the resources to invest in mitigation and preparedness. For example, smaller 
organizations may not be able to hire a risk manager.  
This study also finds that concern over disaster impact is a significant positive 
determinant of mitigation and preparedness among Memphis/Shelby County 
organizations. Ownership pattern of organizations is a significant determinant of 
mitigation and preparedness in organizations. In other words, single location 
organizations are less likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness when compared to 
organizations with multiple locations. This result is in line with that of previous research 
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(e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; Drabek, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). One reason for this 
finding is the mandates given to local chapters by corporate headquarters to engage in 
disaster preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). Recall that about 8 in every 10 
organizations in the sample is a single-location organization. The preponderance of 
single-location organizations may have contributed to the moderate level of mitigation 
and preparedness in Memphis/Shelby County.  
This study finds a significant positive relationship between organizations in the 
educational and health sectors and mitigation and preparedness. One interpretation of this 
result is that educational and health sector organizations are more likely to engage in 
mitigation and preparedness activities because they usually deal with vulnerable 
populations like children, the old, and the sick. Conversely, there is a negative 
relationship between mitigation and preparedness and organizations in the 
wholesale/retail sector. One explanation is that organizations in the wholesale/retail 
sector do not usually deal with vulnerable populations. This may be why they are less 
likely than organizations in other sectors to mitigate and prepare for disasters. Dahlhamer 
& D’Souza (1997) also found a negative insignificant relationship between preparedness 
and organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. Furthermore, the coefficients on 
meanobstacle and meanobstacle
2
 show that there is a positive association between 
mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles until organizational obstacle 
peaks and then the association becomes negative. Based on the results of the Tobit 
regression, I reject the null hypotheses that there is no relationship between each of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable.  
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The marginal effects are the same as the Tobit coefficients. The independent 
variable with the biggest marginal effect is education followed by single, then 
wholesale/retail. The independent variable with the smallest marginal effect is disaster 
impact followed by employee size. 
 
Result of the Heckman Approach 
Based on the results of the descriptive statistics my initial expectation was that 
organizations that engaged in mitigation and preparedness are more likely to answer the 
survey than organizations that did not engage in mitigation and preparedness. To correct 
this potential problem, this study uses the Heckman approach. The result of the Heckman 
analysis confirms that the organizational survey data does not suffer from selection bias 
as earlier suggested by descriptive statistics. 
  
Results of the Sample Representative Test and the Specification Tests 
There is no statistical difference between the population mean and the sample 
mean. This means that the organizational survey sample is representative of the 
population based on employee size alone.  
This study performs a RESET test on the data with the aim of investigating 
whether the relationship between the dependent variable and any of the independent 
variables is non-linear. The result of the F-test reveals that meanobstacles
2
 belongs in the 
model. Therefore, I added meanobstacle
2
 to the model.  
After the addition of meanobstacle
2
, this study performs a LINK test to ascertain 
if Tobit is the appropriate function to use and if other determinants belong in the model. 
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The result indicates that the model uses the appropriate function and there are no omitted 
variables. It is important to note that passing these tests does not guarantee that the model 
is properly specified.  
 
Results of the Additional Analyses 
I employed two variables - use of disaster information and availability of a risk 
manager - within the organizational survey data as proxies for the dependent variable. 
The correlation between the initial dependent variable, total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activity and use of disaster information and availability of risk manager are 
0.63 and 0.57 respectively. I ran two Logit regressions, one for each of the two proxies, 
on the same dependent variables as in the previous analysis.  
The result of the first Logit analysis with use of disaster information as the 
dependent variable indicates that the model is significant. All the significant variables in 
the Tobit analysis are also significant in this Logit analysis, except organizational 
obstacle and organizational obstacle
2
. In addition, all the independent variables have the 
same signs in both models. In general, the sizes of the coefficients are smaller in the 
Logit output except the coefficient on wholesale/retail sector.  
The result of the second Logit analysis with risk manager as the dependent 
variable shows that the model is significant. In the Tobit output, all the independent 
variables are significant. However, in the Logit output four independent variables-disaster 
impact, organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle2, and health sector-are 
insignificant. Furthermore, all the independent variables have the same signs in both 
models and the Logit coefficients are smaller than those of the Tobit regression.   
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In addition to the above analyses, I examine each of the mitigation and 
preparedness activities individually using the same independent variables as in the 
previous analyses. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between 
each of the mitigation and preparedness activity and each of the independent variables. 
The most significant dependent variable is employee size followed by single location. In 
fact, employee size is significant and positive in all the 10 activities. Single location is 
significant in all but one activity and has a negative sign in all the activities. At the 
bottom of the table are organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle
2
, and disaster 
impact, which are insignificant in all but one activity each. In sum, these results differ 
from that of the Tobit model.  
Finally, using total disaster impact instead of mean disaster impact did not change 
the initial Tobit result. Similarly, the results of the analyses involving each of the 13 
disaster impacts in lieu of mean disaster impact show that four of the 13 disaster impacts 
are significant with the expected positive signs-inability to communicate with employees, 
inadequate number of employees, loss of life, and transportation disruption. 
In the base Tobit model, all the independent variables are significant. However, 
when the 10 mitigation and preparedness activities were grouped into active and passive 
measures, the results are different. The following variables are insignificant in the active 
measure model-concern over disaster impact, organizational obstacles, organizations in 
the health sector and organizations in the wholesale/retail sector.  In the passive measure 
model, concern over disaster impact and organizational obstacles are not significant 
determinants of passive measures to address disaster risks in organizations. 
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Contributions to the Literature 
 
In Chapter II, this study highlights the contributions made by previous disaster 
studies and emphasizes the gap in the disaster literature regarding the determinants of 
organizational mitigation and preparedness. The discussion reveals that there is no theory 
to guide research on the determinants of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational 
level of analysis. Knowledge of these determinants can help to understand the factors that 
are instrumental in motivating organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness 
measures. This study attempts to narrow this gap by studying the determinants of 
organizational mitigation and preparedness for disasters among Memphis/Shelby County 
organizations.  
In Chapter III, this study develops a theoretical model from prior research on 
business disaster preparedness (e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 
1997; Webb et al., 2000) and earthquake preparedness at the household level (e.g., Nigg, 
1986; Showalter, 1993). This theoretical model has its strengths and weaknesses. A 
cursory look at its strengths reveals that it is simple, clear, and logical. This model is a 
simple representation of reality. The relationships between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable are clear and easy to understand. The expected signs of the 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables are logical. For example, 
it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship between mitigation and preparedness and 
concern over the disaster impact. Based on the RESET and LINK tests, it does appear 
that the model is properly specified. A weakness of this model is the uncertainty 
surrounding how it will behave when used to analyze other datasets.  The limitation of 
this model notwithstanding, I am optimistic it can aid future research in gaining a deeper 
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understanding of the factors that motivate organizations to mitigate and prepare for 
disasters.  
Although, this study is guided by prior research, it extends previous studies by 
investigating a new variable as a determinant of organizational mitigation and 
preparedness for disasters. This variable is organizational obstacle.  
 
Policy Implications 
Organizations concerned over the impact of disasters seem to be more likely than 
those that are not to mitigate and prepare for disasters. This result has an implication for 
policymaking by suggesting that governments may be able to design and implement 
computer programs capable of estimating different type of disaster losses, such as loss of 
live and property. This result is interesting in the context of research on risk and disaster 
visualizations. FEMA and The Mid-America Earthquake Center, for example, have 
invested heavily in Hazus and MAEviz respectively (FEMA 2008; MAE Center, 2006).   
The rationale behind developing these programs is that they can help to visualize disaster 
impacts and motivate organizations and people to act. The result of this study supports 
this rationale. However, this study cannot say whether such programs are effective in 
actually motivating organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness activities because 
this depends, among other factors on the design and implementation of the program. If 
local agencies can design and implement such programs properly, they may be able to 
motivate organizations to mitigate and prepare for disasters.  
The significant positive relationship between organizational size and mitigation 
and preparedness, suggests that governments at all levels should regard small businesses 
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as a special group that may need specific incentives like tax breaks and subsidies to make 
them adopt more mitigation and preparedness activities.  
 
Policy Discussion 
The results of the descriptive statistics do show that in general, Memphis/Shelby 
County organizations discuss disaster issues in organizational meetings. The implication 
for policy is that Memphis/Shelby County governments may be able to use organizational 
meetings as outlet for disseminating disaster-related information and discussing disaster 
issues with Memphis/Shelby County organizations. Structural mitigation is the mitigation 
and preparedness activity Memphis/Shelby County organizations engaged in the least 
over the past year. Policymakers can devise policies that could make it easier for 
organizations to adopt structural mitigation measures. Policy intervention might include 
incentives, such as tax breaks and subsidies for organizations that engage in structural 
mitigation.  
Limitations 
This study has some limitations. First, this study may suffer from omitted variable 
bias because of the omission of some independent variables relevant to mitigation and 
preparedness. Independent variables left out of the analyses include past disaster 
experience, age of the organization, and whether an organization leases or owns its 
business property (Dahlhamer & D’Souza 1997; Mileti 1999). Second, the findings of 
this study are perceptual. In other words, I really do not know what Memphis/Shelby 
County organizations are actually doing to mitigate and prepare for disasters. If perceived 
organizational actions regarding mitigation and preparedness are substantially different 
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from the actual organizational actions, the reliability of my results may be threatened. My 
hope is that the organizational representatives were able to give accurate information 
about their organizations. Third, there were missing values on some of the variables that 
prompted me to recode these variables. The recoded values are not the actual values of 
the missing data. Fourth, adding mitigation and preparedness activities together implies 
that each activity is equally weighted. This may not be a reasonable assumption. For 
instance, it is not reasonable to expect that “Mentioning a potential disaster in an 
organizational meeting” would require the same level of effort as “Engaging in structural 
mitigation”. Fifth, respondent organizations may have inflated their responses regarding 
disaster worry levels for earthquakes because the study in general may have given them 
an indication that the research team was interested in earthquake issues. Lastly, I can only 
say that this study is representative of the population concerning organizational size. I 
cannot say whether this study is representative on unobservable characteristics, such as 
the mitigation and preparedness activities adopted. All these limitations engender words 
of caution in generalizing the results of this study.   
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study suggests several next steps in understanding the determinants of 
organizational mitigation and preparedness.  First, more research is needed to 
understand why organizations mentioned that they engaged in an activity that seem to 
require high effort (engaging in non-structural mitigation measures) over those that 
require low effort (e.g., attending disaster meetings/training courses within the 
organization). Second, it may interest the research community to investigate why 
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organizations are not interested in adopting structural mitigation measures despite 
substantial investment by the federal government in mitigation programs. Third, further 
research in needed that can incorporate the independent variables that this study is 
missing to understand fully the relevant determinants of mitigation and preparedness in 
organizations.  Fourth, it might interest some researchers to investigate the relative costs 
and benefits of each of the mitigation and preparedness activities. Lastly, it might be 
interesting to disaggregate some of the indices and take a closer look at each component 
separately.   
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